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This paper describes the deﬁ  ciencies of the measures used to calculate the federal budget, 
make revenue and spending projections, and assess the sustainability of current ﬁ  scal policies. 
The nature of the deﬁ  ciencies hides the tremendous impact that Social Security and Medicare 
commitments will have on the budget in the future, given the way the programs are structured 
currently and the momentous demographic shift underway as the baby boom generation 
approaches retirement age. This paper proposes two new simple measures that will enable 
government ofﬁ  cials and the public to calculate more accurately the costs of maintaining 
these programs into the relevant future. The measures provide a better understanding of the 
costs involved, when they will be incurred, and by whom. The measures also provide a way 
to meaningfully compare the various solutions that have been proposed for dealing with the 
impending ﬁ  scal crisis that will be caused by Social Security and Medicare.
This article was also published as a monograph by the AEI Press, the publisher for the American 
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3.  This requirement assumes that 
the economy is characterized by 
“dynamic efﬁ  ciency.” A dynami-
cally inefﬁ  cient economy is one 
with excessive capital relative to 
the labor force—one where living 
standards can be improved by 
discarding capital. Abel, Mankiw, 
Summers, and Zeckhauser 
(1989) suggest that the U.S. 
economy has been characterized 
by dynamic efﬁ  ciency since 1929.
Introduction 
Traditional budget measures are becoming obsolete as federal budget priorities shift from providing 
“brick and mortar” public goods toward delivering social insurance services. As the share of retirees 
in the nation’s population balloons and human life spans continue to lengthen, Social Security and 
Medicare transfers will increasingly dominate total federal outlays. Traditional annual cash-ﬂ  ow bud-
get measures may have been sufﬁ  cient when Congress could directly allocate almost all budgetary 
resources via the annual appropriations process. During this century, however, federal spending will 
be determined mostly by factors outside of short-term legislative control. Because the current struc-
ture of Social Security and Medicare involves long-term payment obligations, backward-looking or 
short-term measures such as debt and deﬁ  cits need to be complemented by long-term, forward-
looking ones that explicitly measure future payment obligations relative to the resources available 
to meet them under current laws. Such measures are needed to assess how far the federal budget is 
from ﬁ  scal sustainability, and the size of policy changes needed to achieve sustainability.
Many, if not most, analysts and policymakers use traditional ﬁ  scal measures such as debt held by 
the public, deﬁ  cit projections over limited (usually ﬁ  ve- or ten-year) horizons, or seventy-ﬁ  ve year 
estimates of Social Security and Medicare ﬁ  nancial shortfalls.1 Some budget analysts acknowledge 
that short-term measures such as national debt and deﬁ  cits are inadequate, as they signiﬁ  cantly un-
derstate the ﬁ  nancial shortfall that the federal government faces under today’s ﬁ  scal policies.2 As a 
consequence, the degree to which current policy is unsustainable remains hidden from policymak-
ers. In addition, we argue here, reliance on traditional measures introduces a policy bias favoring 
current debt minimization at the expense of policies that are sounder from a long-term perspec-
tive. Even under seventy-ﬁ  ve-year budget measures, we believe the federal ﬁ  scal shortfall would be 
signiﬁ  cantly understated, hindering objective ﬁ  scal policymaking. Nevertheless, ofﬁ  cial budgeting 
agencies continue to promote such measures: The recently published Budget of the United States 
Government, Fiscal Year 2004 (hereafter Budget) reports seventy-ﬁ  ve-year “actuarial deﬁ  ciency” 
measures for Social Security and Medicare.
We propose that federal budget agencies such as the Ofﬁ  ce of Management and Budget and 
the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce should begin reporting a pair of measures on a regular basis to 
track the true costs of current ﬁ  scal policy: Fiscal Imbalance (FI) and Generational Imbalance (GI). 
The FI measure for the federal government is the current federal debt held by the public plus the 
present value in today’s dollars of all projected federal non-interest spending, minus all projected 
federal receipts. The FI measure indicates the amount in today’s dollars by which ﬁ  scal policy must 
be changed in order to be sustainable: A sustainable ﬁ  scal policy requires FI to be zero.3 The GI 
measure indicates how much of this imbalance is caused, in particular, by past and current genera-
tions.
The FI measure is similar to the standard perpetuity “open-group liability” concept that is some-
times used to analyze shortfalls in social insurance programs, while the GI measure is similar to the 
standard “closed-group liability” concept. The FI measure is also sometimes called the “ﬁ  scal gap” 
(see Auerbach, Gale, Orszag, and Potter 2003). We argue here that the FI and GI measures together 
possess several desirable properties, the most important being that they render policy decisions 
free of the aforementioned bias because they enable comparisons of alternative policies on a neu-
tral footing.
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1The Fiscal Imbalance associated with today’s federal ﬁ  scal policy is very large. Taking present 
values as of ﬁ  scal-year-end 2002, and interpreting the policies in the FY 2004 federal Budget as “cur-
rent policies,” the federal government’s total Fiscal Imbalance is $44.2 trillion. By “present value,” we 
mean that all future spending and revenue not only are reduced for inﬂ  ation but are additionally 
discounted by the government’s (inﬂ  ation-adjusted) long-term borrowing rate. For example, after 
accounting for inﬂ  ation, a dollar of revenue or outlay as of ﬁ  scal-year-end 2003 is only worth about 
97 cents as of ﬁ  scal-year-end 2002; a dollar received or paid 100 years from now is worth only about 
3 cents. This present-value calculation allows us to determine how much money the government 
must come up with immediately to put ﬁ  scal policy on a sustainable course. Since the government 
obviously does not have an extra $44.2 trillion today, it must make cuts or increase revenue in future 
years that add up to $44.2 trillion in present value. Of course, for their discounted value to equal 
$44.2 trillion in present value, the cumulative value of these policies will have to be substantially 
more than $44.2 trillion. See the text box below for a discussion of the present value concept.
Of the current federal FI of $44.2 trillion, Social Security’s FI is about $7 trillion in present value. 
Medicare’s FI is $36.6 trillion (for both Parts A and B), of which Part A (the Hospital Insurance 
program) contributes $20.5 trillion and Part B (the Supplementary Medical Insurance program) 
contributes $16.1 trillion.4 By contrast, the rest of the federal government’s FI is only $0.5 trillion, 
which comprises a $4.6 trillion surplus in revenues minus obligations to Social Security, Medicare, 
and publicly held debt of $5.1 trillion.
As most investors know, a dollar received one year from today is not worth as 
much as a dollar received today. The reason is that a dollar received today can 
be invested, say in a bank account, to earn interest income over the year. This 
same intuition holds for the government as well. A dollar received in revenue in 
the future is not as valuable to the federal government as a dollar of revenue re-
ceived today. The reason is that a dollar received today would allow the govern-
ment to reduce its level of federal debt held by the public and, hence, reduce the 
interest payments it must make to nongovernment entities. Similarly, it costs the 
government more to pay a dollar today than paying a dollar next year, because 
of larger borrowing costs.
The “present value” operation is a way of converting future dollars to current dol-
lars. It not only adjusts for changes in inﬂ  ation over time, it additionally “discounts” 
(i.e., reduces) the value of future dollars in order to recognize that a future dol-
lar is not worth as much as a dollar received or paid today. Naturally, dollars in 
the distant future are discounted by more than dollars at a nearer date since the 
government must pay more interest income to borrow money over many years. 
The present value operation, therefore, allows us to consistently compare dollars 
received or owed at different times by adjusting for the interest costs. Failing to 
discount future dollars could potentially present a very misleading picture of the 
government’s ﬁ  nancial position by ignoring borrowing costs.
While the government often uses the present value operation to compare differ-
ent policy options, the ﬁ  ve-year and ten-year budget tables reported by the Of-
ﬁ  ce of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce 
(CBO) are not stated in the present-value form. Instead, when describing accu-
mulated deﬁ  cits, the CBO and OMB use an ad-hoc approach to adjust for the 
government’s borrowing costs: They include interest spending as part of the gov-
ernment’s outlay and then sum undiscounted values over different years. But this 
approach facilitates attempts at “budget arbitrage” even within the short ﬁ  ve-year 
and ten-year budget windows. Bazelon and Smetters (1999) discuss how the 
present value concept is used in the federal budget process.
VIEWING GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS AND REVENUE IN “PRESENT VALUE”
4.  As we explain later, consistent 
with the Social Security and 
Medicare Trustees, we assume 
that health care per capita grows 
one percentage point faster than 
GDP per capita until 2080—a 
very conservative assumption 
relative to the past two decades. 
Between 2080 and 2100, the 
one percentage point differential 
is gradually reduced to zero, 
thereby assuming that health 
care spending grows no faster 
than GDP. Even with these very 
cautious assumptions, very large 
Medicare Fiscal Imbalances exist.
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2Our estimate of today’s federal Fiscal Imbalance is more than ten times as large as today’s debt 
held by the public that arose from past federal ﬁ  nancial shortfalls. The reason is that FI also includes 
prospective ﬁ  nancial shortfalls. Hence, policy changes that eliminate only the debt held by the pub-
lic would still leave the federal government far from being ﬁ  nancially solvent. In particular, spending 
must be reduced and/or taxes increased in order to put federal ﬁ  scal policy on a sustainable course. 
Moreover, the FI grows by about $1.6 trillion per year to about $54 trillion by just 2008 unless cor-
rective policies are implemented before then. This rapid annual increment is also about ten times as 
large as the ofﬁ  cial annual deﬁ  cit reported for ﬁ  scal year 2002.
How much must we cut federal spending or increase federal receipts to eliminate the current 
$44.2 trillion FI? We estimate that an additional 16.6 percent of annual (uncapped) payrolls would 
have to be taxed away forever beginning today to achieve long-term ﬁ  scal sustainability—imply-
ing a greater than doubling of the current payroll tax rate of 15.3 percent that is currently paid 
in equal shares by employees and employers to the Social Security and Medicare systems. Alterna-
tively, income tax revenues would have to be hiked permanently by another two-thirds beginning 
immediately—increasing their share in gross domestic product (GDP) from 9.5 percent to 15.9 
percent. Other (equally drastic) alternatives would be to cut Social Security and Medicare beneﬁ  ts 
by 45 percent immediately and forever, or permanently eliminate all future federal discretionary 
spending—although the latter policy still falls short by about $1.8 trillion. Moreover, the size of the 
necessary corrective policies will grow larger the longer their adoption is postponed. For example, 
waiting until just 2008 before initiating corrective policies would require a permanent increase in 
wage taxes by 18.2 percentage points, rather than 16.6 percentage points if we began today.
Finally, this paper shows that the estimated Fiscal Imbalance remains large regardless of varia-
tions in underlying economic assumptions. Calculations under alternative growth and discount rate 
assumptions suggest a low-side estimate of federal FI of $29 trillion and, under still quite conserva-
tive assumptions, a high-side estimate of $64 trillion. Although FI expressed in today’s dollars is fairly 
sensitive to these economic assumptions, we argue below that this sensitivity only strengthens the 
need to focus on FI rather than on traditional shorter-term ﬁ  scal measures. Furthermore, the ratios 
of FI to the present value of GDP and future payrolls—and, consequently, estimates of tax hikes or 
spending cuts required to restore ﬁ  scal sustainability—are less sensitive to alternative economic 
assumptions because the denominators (GDP and the payroll base, respectively) are similarly sensi-
tive to the underlying assumptions. As discussed below, although FI is smaller ($36.9 trillion) under 
our low productivity growth rate assumption, it declines by less than the present value of payrolls. 
Consequently, the wage-tax hike needed to eliminate FI is larger under the low productivity growth 
rate assumption—18 percentage points compared to 16.6 percentage points under baseline as-
sumptions. Under our high growth rate assumption, a 14.8 percentage point wage-tax increase 
would be needed to eliminate FI.
The Fiscal Imbalance Measure
The federal government provides a myriad of public goods and services. Programs such as Social 
Security and Medicare provide retirement and health security to American citizens and residents. 
Other programs include national defense, homeland security, judicial and legislative operations, in-
ternational diplomacy, transportation, energy, infrastructure development, education, and income 
support for the needy.
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3Whether these programs can continue to operate indeﬁ  nitely at current service levels depends 
upon the availability of resources to ﬁ  nance them. All federal purchases and debt-service payments 
must be ﬁ  nanced out of future federal revenues. Sources of federal revenue include tax receipts, net 
income of public enterprises, fees, and other levies. Although the government can borrow money, 
additional debt must also be serviced out of future tax receipts. Hence, current (net) debt held by 
the public plus the government’s future non-interest spending must be balanced over time by its 
future receipts.5
The government’s total ﬁ  scal policy may be considered balanced if today’s publicly held debt 
plus the present value of projected non-interest spending is equal to the present value of projected 
government receipts. The spending and revenue projections are made under today’s ﬁ  scal policies. 
“Present values” mean that dollars paid or received throughout the future are discounted at the 
government’s long-term interest rate in order to reﬂ  ect their true value today (see text box on page 
2). A ﬁ  scal policy that is balanced can be sustained without changing either federal outlays or federal 
revenues. Hence, the Fiscal Imbalance measure as of the end of year t is deﬁ  ned as:
 (1)  FIt = PVEt – PVRt -- At.
This deﬁ  nition is simply understood as the excess of total expenditures over available resources 
in present value. Here, PVEt stands for the present value of projected expenditures under current 
policies at the end of period t. PVRt stands for the present value of projected receipts under current 
policies, and At represents assets in hand at the end of period t.
The FI measure can be calculated for the entire federal government. It can also be calculated 
separately for federal programs that are ﬁ  nanced with dedicated revenues, such as Social Security 
and Medicare. FI can also be calculated for the rest of the government, reﬂ  ecting the government’s 
spending obligations and tax resources outside of Social Security and Medicare.
When calculating FI for programs such as Social Security and Medicare,  At is positive and equal 
in value to the program’s respective trust fund, which reﬂ  ects the excess of previous payroll contri-
butions over spending by past and current generations. When calculating FI for the rest of govern-
ment, however, the value of At is negative since it reﬂ  ects monies owed to these trust funds as well 
as the money owed to the public that is holding government debt. The level of debt held by the 
public, in turn, reﬂ  ects the excess of spending over revenue by past and current generations.
While the variable At reﬂ  ects the excess of revenue over spending done by past and current 
generations, the difference PVEt – PVRt  shown in equation (1) reﬂ  ects the contribution to FI from 
all projected ﬁ  nancial shortfalls and surpluses—those on account of living and future generations. 
Hence, FI measures the aggregate ﬁ  nancial shortfall from all generations—past, living, and future.
For the entire federal government’s policy to be sustainable, its FI must be zero. The government 
cannot spend and owe more than it will receive as revenue in present value. In other words, while 
the government can spend more than it collects in taxes on some generations, other generations 
must eventually “pay the piper,” thereby returning the Fiscal Imbalance to zero.6 Similarly, FI’s for 
programs such as Social Security and Medicare must equal zero if they are to continue without 
changes to revenues or outlays. Hence, if the FI measured under current policies is positive, those 
policies are unsustainable and policymakers will have to change them at some future point in time.
5.  Because outstanding debt held by 
the public is included among the 
obligations that must be ﬁ  nanced, 
projected interest outlays are 
excluded when calculating the 
present value of projected spend-
ing to avoid double counting.
6.  Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and 
Zeldes (1998) discuss the implica-
tions of this type of zero-sum 
constraint for analyzing Social 
Security reform.
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4The Generational Imbalance Measure
To be useful to policymakers, any proposed measure must be able to fully reﬂ  ect the ﬁ  scal impact 
of all possible policy changes. The FI measure alone, however, is not capable of doing so for all types 
of policy changes. As is obvious from equation (1), any new policy that changes projected expendi-
tures and revenues so that their increments are exactly equal in present value will produce offset-
ting increases in PVEt  and/or PVRt, leaving FI unchanged. However, such FI-neutral policies could 
nevertheless transfer net tax burdens from living to future generations. Therefore, we need a com-
plementary measure to show such redistributions of ﬁ  scal burdens.
For example, suppose that Congress passes legislation to immediately reduce Social Security 
payroll taxes but sharply increase payroll taxes in twenty years. If the revenue loss from the imme-
diate tax reduction is equal in present value to the magnitude of the revenue gain in twenty years, 
then the value of PVRt shown in equation (1) remains unchanged. As a result, Social Security’s FI 
remains unchanged, as does the federal government’s total FI. But clearly such a policy would shift 
substantial amounts of resources across generations.
As another example, suppose Congress creates a new Medicare beneﬁ  t and ﬁ  nances it by 
raising payroll taxes such that each year’s additional outlay is matched by additional revenue. By 
construction, this policy has no impact on Medicare’s FI and, therefore, no impact on the federal 
government’s total FI. The reason is that the values of PVEt  and PVRt  shown in equation (1) in-
crease by the same amount after this policy change, thereby producing no change in the value of 
their difference, PVEt − PVRt. Nevertheless, this policy could potentially shift a substantial amount 
of resources away from future generations and toward current generations, similar to the previous 
example. In particular, current retirees and workers about to retire at the time of the policy change 
would gain from the new Medicare beneﬁ  t, for which they will pay little or nothing. Younger work-
ers and future generations, however, would be worse off because they will not fully recover the 
value of their additional taxes via their own additional retirement beneﬁ  t: The investment income 
that they would lose on the resources now devoted to paying additional payroll taxes will not be 
fully made up by their future beneﬁ  ts.7
To identify such ﬁ  scally induced redistributions, therefore, we need to augment the FI measure 
with another measure. Because FI exclusively reﬂ  ects the sustainability of a given policy, the com-
plementary measure should indicate how FI is distributed across population subgroups. Although 
it is possible to complement FI with measures of its distribution across cohorts distinguished by 
year-of-birth, gender, race, and so forth, we adopt a more modest approach and follow the standard 
“closed-group liability” concept—showing the component of FI that arises due to past and living 
generations. We call this measure Generational Imbalance, or GI. We deﬁ  ne the GI measure as:
(2) GIt = PVEL
t  – PVRL
t  − At.
PVEL
t  represents the present value of projected outlays that will be paid to current generations. 
PVRL
t  represents the present value of projected tax revenues from the same generations. At, again, 
represents the program’s current assets. Note that if the program has positive current assets, past 
tax payments exceeded the program’s outlays to date. Therefore, GI captures the part of FI arising 
from all transactions with past and living generations throughout their lifetimes. The projected con-
tribution to FI by future generations simply equals the difference, FI minus GI.8
7.  This result, again, assumes that 
the economy is dynamically 
efﬁ  cient. See note 3.
8.  As shown in appendix A, the 
measure for future generations, 
FI-GI, can be further broken down 
into projected net transfers to 
each future birth cohort under 
current policy. These estimates 
are not reported in this paper, 
but they are available from the 
authors upon request.
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5Our proposed GI measure should not be confused with Generational Accounting—the measure 
developed by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991).9 Generational Accounting involves a hypo-
thetical policy reform that restores FI to zero by increasing the net tax burden on unborn genera-
tions. Generational Accounting’s measure equals the difference in the net tax burdens per capita on 
current newborns (not affected by the hypothetical reform) and future generations. Hence, Gen-
erational Accounting’s measure incorporates a hypothetical and sustainable policy. In contrast, the 
FI and GI measures correspond to current law, making them more applicable as a budget concept. 
One reason why the FI and GI measures are easy to understand is that they don’t incorporate any 
hypothetical policy change.
Returning to the previous example, a new pay-as-you-go Medicare beneﬁ  t  would  increase 
Medicare’s imbalance on account of past and living generations (GI) and reduce the imbalance on 
account of future generations (FI – GI) by the same amount, leaving the overall Fiscal Imbalance (FI) 
unchanged (see text box below). In other words, past and living generations would receive a wind-
fall that is directly offset by a reduction in the resources available to future generations. Medicare’s 
FI does not capture this redistribution because it adds together the net Medicare transfers received 
by all generations—past, living, and future—under current policies. This redistribution is, however, 
indicated by the change in GI.
Note that the traditional focus on the publicly held debt would also not capture the redistribu-
tive impact of the Medicare policy described earlier: Outstanding debt remains unchanged for 
any new outlay that is ﬁ  nanced on a strictly pay-as-you-go basis, since the outlays in each year are 
PAY-AS-YOU-GO PROGRAMS AND THE GENERATIONAL IMBALANCE MEASURE
Consider the following simple example: Divide each generation’s lifespan into two 
parts—“work” and “retirement.” For simplicity, assume that both phases require the 
same length of time; that there is no inﬂ  ation; that the interest rate equals 3 percent; 
and that productivity growth always equals zero.10 All generations are assumed to 
live for exactly two periods. A new generation of workers of ﬁ  xed size is born in each 
period. One period’s workers grow to be the next period’s retirees. Hence, one gen-
eration of workers and one generation of retirees are alive in any given period.
Now suppose that a new pay-as-you-go Medicare program conferring $100 beneﬁ  t 
to retirees is introduced in period 1 and it is ﬁ  nanced by a payroll tax on period-1’s 
workers of $100. The net value of this beneﬁ  t to period-1’s retirees is $100—equal 
to the beneﬁ  t they receive in period 1. For workers in period 1, however, the value 
of the new program equals the present value of next period’s Medicare beneﬁ  t—
$100/1.03 = $97.09—minus period-1’s payroll tax of $100. Hence, the net value 
of this program for these workers is a loss of $2.91. It equals the present value 
of the interest they could have earned in period 2 on their $100 payroll taxes—
$3/1.03 = $2.91. Hence, the GI corresponding to just this new Medicare policy 
equals the sum of the net beneﬁ  ts of those alive in period 1—that is, $100 − $2.91 = 
$97.09. This GI will be in addition to any preexisting GI.
Now consider the impact of this Medicare policy on future generations. Workers in 
period 2 also pay $100 when working and receive beneﬁ  ts worth $100 when retired. 
Hence, when the present value is taken as of period 2, they also lose $2.91. How-
ever, discounting this loss back to period 1 reduces it to $2.91/(1 + 0.03) = $2.83. 
Similarly, workers in period 3 lose $2.91 when the present value is taken as of 
period 3. But this loss equals $2.91/(1 + 0.03)2 = $2.74 as of period 1. As of 
period 1, therefore, the present value loss to all future generations equals the sum: 
[$2.91/(1 + 0.03) + $2.91/(1 + 0.03)2 + $2.91/(1 + 0.03)3 + …]. When taken over all 
future generations, this sum equals exactly $97.09. This loss to all future generations 
is exactly equal to GI—the gain to past and living generations in present value as of 
period 1. Hence, FI is unchanged by this policy because the gain to past and cur-
rent generations (GI) is exactly offset in present value by the loss to all future gen-
erations (FI – GI).
9.  For the latest available estimates 
of United States’ generational ac-
counts, see Gokhale and Kotlikoff 
(2001).
10. Incorporating productivity growth 
makes the example complicated 
but does not change its basic 
message as long as this growth is 
not so large as to imply dynamic 
inefﬁ  ciency (see note 3).
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6ﬁ  nanced with taxes collected in that year. Note, however, that the level of publicly held debt would 
increase for a lengthy amount of time in the previous example where taxes are decreased initially 
and then increased after twenty years. Interestingly, both policies shift a large ﬁ  nancial burden from 
current generations to future generations. In fact, with only minor adjustments, it is possible to con-
struct both policies so that identical burdens are shifted across generations. Yet the level of publicly 
held debt increases in the tax cut example but not in the Medicare beneﬁ  t example. This distinction 
makes little sense economically—a point emphasized by Kotlikoff (2001).
So, while the Fiscal Imbalance measure properly captures many large unfunded payment ob-
ligations not included in traditional accountings of public debt, both measures fail to reveal the 
resource transfers across generations that some policies can cause. The GI measure does, however, 
capture the redistributive effect of all policies. Under the pay-as-you-go ﬁ  nanced Medicare policy 
described above, the GI measure increases even though FI does not change. Of course, this implies 
that the imbalance on account of future generations decreases. Hence, FI and GI measures taken 
together comprise a powerful analytical tool for policymakers, enabling more informed decisions.
In the future, policymakers must achieve two objectives simultaneously: First, they must reduce 
the Fiscal Imbalance to zero by either increased taxes or reduced spending, or a combination of 
both. This can be accomplished in a myriad of ways, each of which will affect the burden placed 
on future generations differently. For example, lowering the growth of entitlement beneﬁ  ts—which 
affects those about to retire—will be more beneﬁ  cial to future generations than increasing, say, 
payroll taxes—which leaves today’s older generations unaffected but negatively impacts today’s 
workers and future generations. Hence, the second objective for policymakers is to choose a policy 
that delivers the best trade-off in costs imposed on different generations. The GI measure offers 
policymakers a parsimonious approach for analyzing this issue and choosing among different sus-
tainable paths.
Identifying the GI component of FI is feasible for programs such as Social Security and Medicare, 
where outlays can be easily attributed to different individuals. It cannot be easily identiﬁ  ed, however, 
for the rest of the federal government because the beneﬁ  ts of outlays (such as spending on national 
defense or public infrastructure) cannot easily be allocated to different generations. For example, 
much of the beneﬁ  t from spending on education or national defense accrues to society in general 
and, to some extent, to unborn generations. Only the revenue side of the rest-of-government’s bud-
get may be so attributed.11 Hence, for the rest of the federal government, we can only report how 
revenues can be distributed into the accounts of past and living generations. Although this does not 
fully correspond to the GI measure, it is nevertheless useful to know the generational distribution 
of the burden of paying for the rest-of-government’s outlays under current policies.
The Desirable Properties of a Fiscal Measure
As we outline in table 1, the FI and GI ﬁ  scal measures have several desirable characteristics that oth-
er ﬁ  scal measures do not. We discuss these properties in this section.
The ﬁ  rst desirable property of a proper ﬁ  scal measure is that it should be forward-looking. 
Under current budget accounting, many analysts and policymakers (as well as the general public) 
tend to focus on annual deﬁ  cits and the level of debt held by the public.12 For years, policymakers 
and public-interest groups have debated how to control deﬁ  cits and debt. These measures, how-
ever, substantially understate the true magnitude of the ﬁ  scal shortfall that the federal government 
11.  Note that we can only estimate 
the direct and immediate 
incidence of taxes on different 
generations but not the ultimate 
incidence that includes the 
distorting effects that taxes have 
on work-effort and consumption-
saving decisions. Bohn (1992) 
discusses this type of difﬁ  culty in 
more detail.
12. To be sure, alternative concepts 
of debt do exist in Budget 
reports—gross debt, debt subject 
to ceiling, debt held in trust funds, 
and debt held by the public. But 
these measures suffer from the 
same problems as the debt held 
by the public that we identify 
here. We focus our attention on 
debt held by the public because 
it is the most meaningful concept 
for measuring overall federal 
indebtedness.
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7faces. Speciﬁ  cally, the large future obligations associated with Social Security and Medicare are not 
reported in standard budget documents, which focus primarily on the effect that current policies 
have on current ﬁ  scal ﬂ  ows. Adopting new forward-looking budget measures would reveal a very 
different and more accurate picture of the federal government’s ﬁ  nancial status, as well as the size 
and nature of needed policy adjustments. Indeed, as the results below suggest, even if we could im-
mediately pay off the entire $3.5 trillion of outstanding debt, federal spending would nevertheless 
have to be reduced and/or revenues increased by about $41 trillion in present value to make the 
system sustainable in the long run.
A second desirable feature of a proper ﬁ  scal measure is that it should include all future years. 
That is, it should be calculated in perpetuity. Several agencies have been regularly reporting other 
forward-looking measures. For example, the Social Security and Medicare Trustees’ measure of 
“actuarial balance” incorporates those programs’ assets and seventy-ﬁ  ve-year-ahead projections of 
revenues and outlays. Normal cash ﬂ  ow budget reporting covers a span of only ﬁ  ve or ten future 
years. However, the most recent Budget also reports seventy-ﬁ  ve-year present-value “actuarial deﬁ  -
ciencies” for Social Security and Medicare based on information included in the Trustees Reports 
and prepared by the same actuaries.
As is well known, however, such measures do not completely account for those programs’ ﬁ  scal 
imbalances because of the arbitrary truncation of the projection horizon at seventy-ﬁ  ve years. As 
the seventy-ﬁ  ve-year projection window moves forward over time, the cumulative inclusion of an 
additional year’s deﬁ  cit or surplus will impart instability to such measures even if the underlying 
revenue and outlay projections remain unchanged. If deﬁ  cits (or surpluses) beyond the seventy-ﬁ  fth 
year are especially large and growing, measures based on seventy-ﬁ  ve-year-ahead projections will 
severely understate the true magnitude of the program’s Fiscal Imbalance by two-thirds or more. 
As shown later, this occurs even though each dollar beyond seventy-ﬁ  ve years is heavily discounted 
and, hence, receives a considerably smaller weight in present-value calculation.13 Moreover, seventy-
ﬁ  ve-year measures preserve some of current policy bias in favor of short-term ﬁ  xes. That would be 
true, for example, if the costs of a future reform fall within the seventy-ﬁ  ve-year window while some 
of its beneﬁ  ts fall outside it.
Indeed, the bias created by the seventy-ﬁ  ve-year measure was the key reason why the maximum 
size of the personal accounts was limited to a $1,000 annual contribution (indexed over time with 
wages) in model 2 of the president’s Social Security Commission. Whereas today’s Social Security 
13. Before 1965, Social Security’s 
Trustees calculated that 
program’s ﬁ  nancial imbalance 
in perpetuity. However, because 
Social Security beneﬁ  ts were 
not indexed to prices, the 
perpetuity estimates incorporated 
“level-cost” beneﬁ  ts over time. 
Imbalance estimates based 
on level costs were not heavily 
inﬂ  uenced by the truncation of the 
projection horizon to seventy-ﬁ  ve 
years. Indeed, the 1965 Advisory 
Council on Social Security 
noted that truncation reduced the 
projected shortfall by less than 
3 percent. Not surprisingly, the 
1965 Advisory Council concluded: 
“It serves no useful purpose to 
present estimates as if they had 
validity in perpetuity.” However, 
Social Security’s chief actuary at 
the time agreed that including all 
future years was the appropriate 
choice, at least in theory. (See 
the Oral History Interview by 
Robert Myers available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/ 
myersorl.html.) Today, however, 
retirement beneﬁ  ts are indexed 
for price inﬂ  ation. Moreover, 
Social Security beneﬁ  t formulae 
take into account real wage 
growth over beneﬁ  ciaries’ working 
lifetimes. Therefore, the practical 
motivation for truncating the 
projection horizon to seventy-ﬁ  ve 
years no longer exists. Indeed, 
such truncation under-estimates 
Social Security’s long-term 
imbalance by two-thirds.
PROPERTIES OF ALTERNATIVE FISCAL MEASURES
Various Budget Measures
Properties of budget measures


















Forward looking  
Calculated in perpetuity 
Comprehensive  
Based on current policy  
Correctly indicates impact of 
all policies

Easy to communicate  
TABLE 1
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8beneﬁ  t formula allows for growth in the real (inﬂ  ation-adjusted) value of successive retiree cohorts’ 
beneﬁ  ts, model 2 proposes eliminating such growth. As a result, the purchasing power of Social 
Security beneﬁ  ts received by later-retiring cohorts would remain the same (rather than increase) 
relative to that of earlier retiring cohorts.
Social Security’s scheduled outlays, therefore, would decrease over time. However, much of the 
cost saving from such a change falls outside of the seventy-ﬁ  ve-year window and, therefore, is not 
captured by the seventy-ﬁ  ve-year estimate. Had model 2 been analyzed using the FI and GI measures 
suggested here, the commissioners would have had the ﬂ  exibility to recommend larger personal 
accounts.14
A third desirable feature of a ﬁ  scal measure is that it be complete—that is, it should encompass 
the entire government’s operations. Otherwise, the measures would be subject to manipulation— 
“budget arbitrage”—by reshufﬂ  ing revenues and outlays among programs. This issue has been 
particularly important in recent Social Security reform discussions where some plans recommend 
using general revenues to shoulder some of the burden of future shortfalls. These transfers are not 
indicated by the traditional seventy-ﬁ  ve-year measures that focus only on Social Security and Medi-
care, creating the illusion of free money.
A fourth desirable property is that the measure should be based on current ﬁ  scal policy. For a 
proposed measure to be useful for policymaking, it must characterize today’s ﬁ  scal policy. That is, 
it should incorporate projected revenues and outlays based on the continuation of current policy, 
revealing how far current policy is from being sustainable.15 The measure should not incorporate 
hypothetical policies.16
For example, a Social Security “shutdown” liability measure based on “accrual accounting” is one 
potential alternative to the GI measure proposed here.17 Like the GI measure, accrual accounting 
attempts to measure the unfunded ﬁ  nancial obligations arising because of current and past gen-
erations. The accrual concept considers a hypothetical reform in which current participants are 
effectively bought out of the Social Security system based on their previous contributions, thereby 
allowing Social Security to be shut down. However, many current participants would actually be 
better off if they left the Social Security system, because it represents a bad deal for them. Indeed, 
they would be willing to pay to leave the system. Hence, accrual accounting overestimates the true 
burden imposed by current and past generations associated with the continuation of Social Security 
(see Smetters and Walliser, forthcoming). Accrual accounting must also rely on some fairly arbitrary 
rules for determining a person’s beneﬁ  t when he or she has a limited work history. Finally, accrual 
accounting deviates from current law by treating past contributions as obligations of the United 
States government—that is, as beneﬁ  ts “owed” rather than as a description of scheduled beneﬁ  ts 
corresponding to current policy.18 The accrual concept makes sense for a private corporation that 
cannot assume that it will be in business in future years and, therefore, cannot include future ex-
pected pension contributions into its analysis. The concept appears less appealing for describing 
the federal government’s ﬁ  nances.
Fifth, the measure should also correctly reﬂ  ect the impact of all policy changes. This condition 
has two complementary components: First, the measure should not change when policy changes 
are actuarially neutral for all generations. That is, if a policy alters future taxes, beneﬁ  ts, or outlays in 
a way that leaves all generations’ resources unaffected in present value, the measure should remain 
unchanged. Second, it must accurately reﬂ  ect all actuarially non-neutral policies. As noted in the 
15.  In some cases—such as discre-
tionary outlays subject to annual 
appropriations—it is uncertain 
what “current policy” entails for 
the long term. For example, under 
the Budget Enforcement Act of 
1990, discretionary appropria-
tions were temporarily subject 
to statutory limits with no clear 
principle guiding their evolution 
after the limits expired. In such 
circumstances, our proposed 
measure would adopt a conven-
tion consistent with longer-term 
historical experience: Long-term 
outlay/revenue growth will occur in 
tandem with overall economic growth 
after such temporary rules expire.
16. An example of a measure based 
on such a hypothetical policy 
is the concept of generational 
balance developed in Auerbach, 
Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991), 
and discussed brieﬂ  y above. This 
measure distributes a component 
of the overall ﬁ  scal burden equally 
across all futureborn cohorts. See 
the critique by Diamond (1996). Also, see 
Liu, Rettenmaier, and Saving (2002).
17. Accrual accounting for Social 
Security has been analyzed 
by Jackson (2002). See also 
the Federal Reserve Board’s 
Semiannual Monetary Policy 
Report to the Congress Before 
the United States Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, 11 February 2003.
14. As we explain in the next section, 
the creation of personal accounts 
alone does not affect FI or GI 
when the new personal accounts 
are actuarially fair. However, 
the personal accounts in model 
2 were constructed to be more 
than actuarially fair. The personal 
accounts in model 2, therefore, 
would cost the government more 
resources in present value in the 
form of diverted payroll taxes than 
they would save the government 
in the form of smaller future 
outlays, a point emphasized by 
Diamond and Orszag (2002). As 
a result, the personal accounts 
alone would increase Social 
Security’s FI. However, taken as 
whole, model 2 would substan-
tially reduce Social Security’s 
FI and, in particular, could have 
accommodated much larger 
personal accounts.
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9previous section, the measure should correctly reﬂ  ect the size and direction of intergenerational 
redistributions engineered via pay-as-you-go policies.19
Finally, the sixth desirable feature is that the measure should be conceptually straightforward 
and possess properties that are easy to communicate. One advantage of the FI measure is that, 
under given budget projections, it grows over time at the rate of interest—just like a corpus of debt. 
Hence, a change in the measure from one year to the next can be broken down into the amounts 
due to accumulated interest, policy changes, differences in economic outcomes relative to projec-
tions, and updates to economic assumptions used in making budget projections. The GI measure is 
also simple: It equals the amount of FI due to current and past generations. However, other comple-
mentary measures could also be used, including ones that describe imbalances by narrowly deﬁ  ned 
birth cohorts, gender, race, and so on.
The Bias in Policymaking Arising from Current Budget Accounting
The previous section emphasized that focusing exclusively on backward-looking or short-term ﬁ  s-
cal measures—such as publicly held debt—substantially understates the true magnitude of the fed-
eral government’s ﬁ  scal shortfall. This section discusses the biases that such an understatement can 
introduce into policymaking, in particular with regard to our choices among ways of ﬁ  nancing pro-
grams such as Social Security and Medicare.
Currently, these programs are ﬁ  nanced mostly on a pay-as-you-go basis, whereby workers’ pay-
roll taxes are immediately used up to pay retiree beneﬁ  ts. Individual Social Security taxes are not 
saved to pay for the contributors’ future beneﬁ  ts. To be sure, Social Security and Medicare both have 
trust funds that reﬂ  ect past payroll tax revenue and other receipts in excess of past beneﬁ  t pay-
ments. But their size is very small in comparison to the programs’ future obligations. Moreover, the 
trust funds represent an obligation on the rest-of-federal-government account.20
An alternative system would give individuals the option to invest some of their payroll taxes 
in personal accounts that they would own and control. Suppose, in exchange for this option, a 
person’s Social Security beneﬁ  t is reduced one dollar in present value for each payroll tax dollar 
that the person is allowed to invest in his or her personal account. The retirement beneﬁ  ts of those 
who participate in such a system would consist of reduced traditional Social Security beneﬁ  ts plus 
income derived from their personal account assets. But to pay current retiree beneﬁ  ts, the fed-
eral government would have to borrow an additional dollar for each dollar invested in a personal 
account rather than paid to the government as payroll taxes. This would drive up annual deﬁ  cits and 
public debt. Under traditional accounting, therefore, this reform does not look favorable.
However, the level of publicly held debt is just one component of the government’s true ﬁ  scal 
imbalance. Another component includes the present value of Social Security’s future scheduled 
beneﬁ  ts that are not currently tracked in ofﬁ  cial federal Budget reports. Under this reform, future 
Social Security obligations would decrease by the same amount as the increase in the debt; the 
government’s true ﬁ  scal imbalance, therefore, would remain unchanged. In other words, current 
discussions about Social Security reform start from a biased position, since even a neutral reform 
looks bad under the current focus on public debt. Including the present value of future Social Secu-
rity beneﬁ  ts into the current Budget would remove this bias.
Now suppose, for example, that future Social Security beneﬁ  ts were reduced by a little more 
than one dollar for each dollar of payroll that a person invests into a personal account. This example 
19. The desirable features mentioned 
here imply that the measure 
will be invariant to accounting 
conventions adopted in describing 
different transactions between the 
government and private entities 
(Kotlikoff 2001). The FI and GI 
measures proposed here are 
both invariant to the choice of 
accounting labels. For example, if 
Social Security taxes and beneﬁ  ts 
were relabeled as “borrowing” and 
“repayment,” the size of FI for the 
entire federal government would 
remain unchanged. However, 
this labeling change would result 
in Social Security’s FI being 
reclassiﬁ  ed as a part of debt held 
by the public.
20. Whether previous trust fund 
surpluses have reduced the debt 
held by the public or produced 
higher levels of spending, 
however, is an area of active 
research. See Schieber and 
Shoven (1999), Diamond (2003), 
and Smetters (2003).
18. In Flemming v. Nestor 363 U.S. 603 
(1960), the Supreme Court made it 
clear that Social Security beneﬁ  ts 
are subject to the discretion of 
policymakers.
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10is very similar to model 1 of the president’s Social Security Commission, where future beneﬁ  ts were 
discounted by 50 basis points above the government’s borrowing rate. Many people might choose 
this plan in order to have more control over their retirement resources. This reform would increase 
publicly held debt over the short term because the government would need to borrow additional 
resources to meet current beneﬁ  t obligations, but the government’s true long-term ﬁ  scal imbalance 
would actually decline, because the increase in debt would be less than the reduction in present 
value of future Social Security beneﬁ  ts. Nonetheless, policymakers would not favor such a plan if 
debt were the only measure used for judging the government’s ﬁ  scal position.
The traditional focus on publicly held debt, therefore, creates a bias in decision-making against 
potential reforms to Social Security and Medicare that could reduce the government’s ﬁ  scal im-
balance. This bias is especially problematic given the large existing imbalances. A more complete 
accounting, which explicitly recognizes the future net obligations of Social Security and Medicare 
as well as the rest of the government, would reduce this bias.
Estimates of Federal Fiscal and Generational Imbalances in the United States
This section reports estimates of total Fiscal Imbalance and, where appropriate, the Generational 
Imbalance for the federal government under the assumption that the Budget’s policies represent 
“current policies.” This so-called policy-inclusive treatment of the federal Budget is consistent with 
how the Budget is usually presented. The calculations are based on long-term Budget projections 
(through the year 2080) provided by the Ofﬁ  ce of Management and Budget (OMB) and, naturally, in-
corporate OMB’s economic assumptions, including a real GDP per capita growth rate of 1.7 percent 
per year after ten years (that is, after projected short-run cyclical effects have elapsed).21 We use a 
real discount rate of 3.6 percent per year, corresponding to the average yield on thirty-year Treasury 
bonds during the past several years.
As demonstrated later, the most important assumption is the future growth rate in real health-
care (Medicare and Medicaid) outlays per capita. Consistent with the Medicare Trustees, our base-
line assumes that real health-care outlays per capita will grow at an annual rate that is 1 percentage 
point faster than the growth rate in GDP per capita until 2080.22 Between 2080 and 2100, that differ-
ential is gradually reduced to zero, so that health-care outlays grow as a share of GDP only because 
of population aging after 2100. These assumptions are considerably more conservative relative to 
historical experience. Indeed, between 1980 and 2001, health-care expenditures have grown by 2.3 
percentage points faster per year than GDP.23
Constructing the GI measures for Social Security and Medicare as well as extending OMB’s pro-
jections beyond 2080 required detailed work using micro-data sets. In particular, we constructed 
eight age–sex proﬁ  les using various micro-data sets corresponding to every tax category (labor, pay-
roll, capital, estate, excise, customs duties, gift taxes, and miscellaneous receipts). Moreover, eighteen 
other age–sex proﬁ  les were constructed corresponding to each of the major outlay programs that 
targets speciﬁ  c population subgroups (Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, federal civilian retire-
ment, veterans’ beneﬁ  ts, SSI, WIC, etc.). Outlay programs whose beneﬁ  ts are more diffused through-
out the population (national defense, justice, international affairs, etc.) were distributed equally 
across population in year of spending. This equal distribution does not represent an “allocation 
of beneﬁ  t” to speciﬁ  c generations. Rather, it is an intermediate step used for projecting aggregate 
discretionary outlays beyond OMB’s projection horizon of 2080. The projection method assumes 
21. This rate of real GDP growth per 
capita is obtained by deﬂ  ating 
projected nominal GDP per capita 
by the projected Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) rather than by the 
GDP deﬂ  ator. This procedure 
implies that all constant dollar 
values reﬂ  ect the opportunity cost 
in consumption units. In addition, 
because the CPI is known to 
contain an upward bias, the FI 
and GI estimates reported here 
are likely to err on the low side.
22. See the Medicare Trustees, 
assumptions on the growth in 
healthcare outlays, available at 
http://www.cms.gov/publications/
trusteesreport/ 2003/tabid1.asp.
23. This calculation is based on 
the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services’ estimates of 
national health-care expenditures 
(see http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
statistics/nhe/historical/t1.asp). 
Hefﬂ  er et al. (2003) provide 
a more detailed breakdown 
by period. They show that 
during 1966–1988, real national 
health expenditures grew at an 
annual average rate of 6.3 percent, 
whereas the chain-weighted GDP 
index grew at 5.4 percent—a 
difference of 0.9 percent. During 
1989–1993, the numbers were 
6.3 percent and 3.2 percent, 
respectively; and during 
1994–2000 they were 3.8 percent 
and 1.8 percent, respectively.
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11that public goods and services per capita grow at the same rate as GDP per capita beyond 2080—
1.7 percent per year.
These age–sex proﬁ  les were then used to decompose the OMB numbers by generation before 
2080 and then to extend OMB’s numbers beyond 2080 using demographic projections relevant for 
those years. The age–sex proﬁ  les also allow us to break down the revenue side of the rest-of-govern-
ment ﬁ  nances by generation. The proﬁ  les must be indexed by age, since the amount and type of 
taxes paid vary by age. The proﬁ  les must also vary by gender because women are projected to live 
longer than men and, therefore, pay different levels of taxes and receive different levels of beneﬁ  ts. 
Even though we do not break down our ﬁ  nal results by gender, incorporating gender into the under-
lying calculations improves the accuracy of our estimates. See the appendixes for details.
FI calculations are reported beginning with ﬁ  scal-year-end 2002. However, to show the evolution 
of FI and GI under current policies and projections, they are recalculated each year through ﬁ  scal 
year 2008. Present values are calculated using projected interest rates on long-term Treasury securi-
ties (also provided by OMB). The appendixes provide detailed descriptions of the methods used in 
extending OMB’s Budget projections.
Total Federal Fiscal Imbalance 
Table 2 comprehensively documents total federal FI, its sources by program, and its breakdown into 
the GI attributable to past and living generations. The ﬁ  rst three panels show FI and GI measures 
for Social Security, Medicare Part A, and Medicare Part B. In each of these panels, the GI measure is 
subdivided into the present value of prospective payments and receipts by living generations and 
the trust fund that includes the net contributions from past transactions. The last row in each panel 
shows the residual—FI minus GI—which indicates the contribution to FI on account of future gen-
erations. Panel 4 of table 2 shows the FI measure for the rest of the federal government—that is, for 
non-Social Security and non-Medicare transactions. As mentioned earlier, the GI measure is not cal-
culated for the rest of the federal government because outlays cannot be easily distributed across 
generations. Instead, only prospective revenues are subdivided into those that living and future gen-
erations are projected to pay under current ﬁ  scal policy.
Total FI for the federal government as of ﬁ  scal-year-end 2002 equals $44.2 trillion (table 2, last 
row). The Social Security program contributes $7 trillion. Medicare contributes $36.6 trillion—the 
largest share by far. The rest-of-federal-government’s contribution is relatively small—only $0.5 tril-
lion. Appendix A shows that the total ﬁ  scal imbalance grows at the rate of interest if no policy action 
is taken to reduce it. This relationship implies that if future projected revenues and outlays remain 
unchanged, the imbalance will quickly grow larger over time. By 2008, for example, it will have 
grown to $54 trillion.
Social Security 
Social Security’s FI of $7 trillion equals the present value of projected Social Security beneﬁ  ts plus 
administrative costs minus the present value of projected payroll taxes, federal employer payments, 
income taxes on Social Security beneﬁ  ts, and minus the initial balances in the Social Security trust 
fund. It is broken down into the GI of $8.8 trillion and the residual, FI minus GI, of minus $1.7 trillion.
Social Security’s imbalance is caused by past and living generations. In particular, as of 2002, past 
and living generations are projected to receive $8.8 trillion more in beneﬁ  ts than they will contrib-
ute in payroll taxes (using the present value of both beneﬁ  ts and taxes). In contrast, future genera-
POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 5, DECEMBER 2003
12tions are projected to pay $1.7 trillion more in taxes than they will receive in beneﬁ  ts. Hence, under 
current tax and beneﬁ  t rules, future generations are projected to reduce Social Security’s imbalance 
by $1.7 trillion, but not by enough to restore the Social Security program to a sustainable system in 
the presence of the $8.8 trillion liability “overhang” left over from current and past participants. 24 
For Social Security to fully return to balance, living and future generations must collectively receive 
fewer beneﬁ  ts and/or pay more taxes by $7 trillion in present value. For example, if only future gen-
erations were required to carry the full burden of eliminating Social Security’s FI, they would need 
to pay an additional $7 trillion in taxes or receive equivalently lower beneﬁ  ts. As another example, 
suppose that living generations were required to cover half of Social Security’s imbalance in the 
form of lower beneﬁ  ts or higher taxes while future generations were required to cover the remain-
24. Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and 
Zeldes (1998) show that most 
of Social Security’s overhang 
stems from past generations 
receiving substantially more in 
beneﬁ  ts than they paid in taxes. In 
particular, under our calculations, 
if the amounts of Social Security 
beneﬁ  ts received by past and 
current generations were equal in 
present value to the beneﬁ  ts that 
they received and are projected 
to receive in the future, the size 
of the trust fund would be $10.1 
trillion in 2002, thereby reducing 
Social Security’s GI to zero. In 
this case, we would say that 
Social Security was “fully funded.” 
The actual value of the trust fund, 
however, is only $1.3 trillion. 
Most of the $8.7 trillion difference 
stems from past generations 
receiving more in beneﬁ  ts than 
they paid in taxes.
FISCAL AND GENERATIONAL IMBALANCES IN SOCIAL SECURITY, MEDICARE, AND THE 
REST OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
(present values in billions of constant 2002 dollars; ﬁ  scal year-end)
TABLE 2
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Fiscal Imbalance (FI) in Social Security 7,022 7,204 7,436 7,692 7,967 8,258 8,569
Imbalance on account of past and living 
generations (GI)
8,771 8,943 9,171 9,424 9,694 9,981 10,289
Future net beneﬁ  ts of living generationsa 10,100 10,398 10,762 11,166 11,593 12,043 12,518
Trust fund −1,329 −1,455 −1,591 −1,742 −1,899 −2,062 −2,230
Imbalance on account of future 
generationsb,c
−1,749 −1,739 −1,736 −1,732 −1,727 −1,723 −1,720
2. Fiscal Imbalance (FI) in Medicare Part A 20,497 21,071 21,764 22,513 23,285 24,091 24,939
Imbalance on account of past and living 
generations (GI)
8,526 8,867 9,265 9,696 10,136 10,600 11,088
Future net beneﬁ  ts of living generationsa 8,755 9,118 9,537 9,991 10,459 10,949 11,464
Trust fund −229 −250 −271 −295 −323 −350 −377
Imbalance on account of future 
generationsb,c
11,972 12,204 12,499 12,817 13,148 13,491 13,851
3. Fiscal Imbalance (FI) in Medicare Part B 16,145 16,519 16,978 17,479 18,009 18,562 19,144
Imbalance on account of past and living 
generations (GI)
6,633 6,853 7,109 7,392 7,693 8,011 8,343
Future net beneﬁ  ts of living generationsa 6,671 6,881 7,140 7,423 7,728 8,046 8,381
Trust fund −39 −28 −32 −32 −35 −36 −38
Imbalance on account of future 
generationsb,c
9,513 9,666 9,869 10,087 10,315 10,552 10,801
Fiscal Imbalance (FI) in Medicare (Parts 
A and B)
36,643 37,590 38,742 39,992 41,293 42,653 44,084
4. Fiscal Imbalance (FI) in the rest of the 
federal government
550 676 753 864 1,005 1,153 1,310
Future outlays 80,676 81,701 83,161 84,780 86,503 88,307 90,202
Future revenues −85,263 −86,552 −88,295 −90,103 −91,985 −93,917 −95,938
Living generations −32,596 −33,273 −34,141 −34,997 −35,885 −36,781 −37,698
Future generations −52,667 −53,278 −54,154 −55,106 −56,100 −57,136 −58,240
Excess future outlays over revenues −4,587 −4,851 −5,134 −5,323 −5,482 −5,609 −5,736
Obligations to Social Security and Medicare 
trust funds
1,597 1,734 1,894 2,069 2,256 2,448 2,644
Debt held by the public 3,540 3,793 3,993 4,119 4,231 4,314 4,402
Total federal Fiscal Imbalance (FI) 44,214 45,470 46,930 48,548 50,265 52,064 53,962
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
NOTE: Positive items increase the Fiscal Imbalance.
a. Those born ﬁ  fteen years ago and earlier. In 2002, for example, this category includes people born before 1988.
b. Those born fourteen years ago and later. In 2002, for example, this category includes people born during 1988 and later.
c. Calculated as FI minus GI.
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13der. In that case, the imbalance on account of past and living generations would decline to approxi-
mately $5.2 trillion in 2002, while the imbalance on account of future generations would be minus 
$5.2 trillion. Thus, some generations must receive less or pay more in order to return Social Security 
to sustainability. Regardless of which policy is chosen, creating balance in Social Security (that is, a 
zero Social Security FI) requires that the Generational Imbalance (GI) caused by past and current 
generations be exactly offset by the imbalance on account of future generations (FI minus GI).
Medicare 
Medicare’s FI is $36.6 trillion—more than ﬁ  ve times as large as Social Security’s imbalance. This 
number reﬂ  ects the projected faster growth of Medicare outlays per capita, in addition to the 
aging of the U.S. population through the next century. The Medicare program has two parts—Part 
A (Hospital Insurance) and Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance). Unlike Medicare Part A, 
which is ﬁ  nanced out of dedicated payroll taxes, Part B is partially ﬁ  nanced out of premiums paid 
by those who choose to participate. Premiums cover roughly 25 percent of Part B’s annual outlay. 
The remaining 75 percent is ﬁ  nanced through transfers from the general fund (rest-of-government 
account) to Medicare Part B’s trust fund. The transfers are made several times each year, based on 
estimated outlays through the following year. Consistent with the view of the Social Security and 
Medicare Trustees, we follow the convention of not counting these transfers as a dedicated re-
source for Medicare Part B.25 This choice reﬂ  ects the principle of associating FI with the program 
that incurs the outlays. Hence, Medicare Part B’s FI is calculated as the present value of projected 
spending minus the present value of projected premium receipts.26 Table 2 shows the breakdown 
of Medicare’s FI arising from Parts A and B. It shows that Part A contributes $20.5 trillion, or about 
56 percent of Medicare’s total FI. At $16.1 trillion, Medicare Part B’s FI is about 80 percent as large 
as that of Medicare Part A.
In sharp contrast to Social Security, a majority of Medicare’s FI arises from future generations (FI 
minus GI) rather than from past and current generations (GI). For example, the GI for Medicare Part 
A is only $8.5 trillion, whereas the residual (FI minus GI) contributes $12 trillion to Medicare Part 
A’s total imbalance of $20.5 trillion. The contributions of past, current, and future generations to 
Medicare Part B’s aggregate Fiscal Imbalance show a similar pattern. The reason for future genera-
tions’ signiﬁ  cantly larger contribution is the rapid projected growth in Medicare outlays per capita 
during the next several decades. As with Social Security, some current or future generations must 
receive less or pay more for Medicare to become ﬁ  scally sustainable.
The Rest of the Federal Government
Table 2 shows that the rest of the federal government’s FI is $550 billion. Under current projections, 
the present value of the rest-of-federal-government’s projected receipts exceeds its non–Social 
Security and non-Medicare outlays by $4.6 trillion. However, the Treasury securities held by the 
Social Security and Medicare trust funds, and counted among those programs’ dedicated resources, 
must be entered as a liability on the rest-of-government’s account. This liability plus debt held by the 
public exceeds the prospective surplus of rest-of-government receipts over outlays by $0.5 trillion. 
Out of the present value of all prospective receipts of $85 trillion, past and living generations are 
projected to contribute only $32.6 trillion, or about 37 percent. Future generations contribute the 
remainder—$52.7 trillion. OMB revenue estimates include a secular rise in revenues relative to GDP 
that could arise from the taxation of withdrawals from assets in tax-deferred savings accounts—as 
25. For example, see chart E in the 
Trustees’ Summary of the 2003 
Annual Reports available at http:
//www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/
trsummary. html.
26. If, alternatively, general 
revenue transfers were treated as 
dedicated revenue to Part B, they 
would appear as an outlay in the 
rest of the Budget and, therefore, 
have no effect on the federal 
government’s total FI. To be sure, 
the exact placement of Part B’s 
revenue in the table is open to 
interpretation. However, we follow 
the Social Security and Medicare 
Trustees’ lead by not representing 
this revenue as “free” to the 
Medicare program.
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14recently claimed by Boskin (2003)—or real bracket creep, or an increase in the number of taxpay-
ers subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax.27
Under the convention adopted here of not counting general revenue ﬁ  nancing of Medicare 
Part B as a resource dedicated to that program, an overwhelming majority—98.8 percent—of total 
federal FI arises from Social Security and Medicare.
Evaluating the Size of Federal Fiscal Imbalance
Comparison with Ofﬁ  cial Estimates 
The FI estimate shown in table 2 dwarfs the traditional measure of ﬁ  scal indebtedness—debt held 
by the public—by more than a factor of ten. The Budget acknowledges the inadequacy of traditional 
budget measures as indicators of the government’s long-term ﬁ  nancial solvency. For example,
“A traditional balance sheet with its focus on past transactions can only show so much 
information. For the government, it is important to anticipate what future budgetary 
requirements might ﬂ  ow from future transactions. Even very long-run Budget projections 
can be useful in sounding warnings about potential problems despite their uncertainty. 
Federal responsibilities extend well beyond the next ﬁ  ve or ten years, and problems that 
may be small in that time frame can become much larger if allowed to grow.” [Budget]
Nevertheless, the Budget’s summary tables do not include complementary indicators of the 
federal government’s ﬁ  scal position.28 Rather, the Budget devotes a separate chapter to report 
the prospective shortfalls in Social Security and Medicare only. An analysis of these estimates is 
presented in the Analytical Perspectives volume of the Budget. These estimates, however, are based 
on the economic assumptions of the Social Security and Medicare Trustees, which differ from the 
economic assumptions that OMB uses in preparing the forecasts that appear elsewhere in the Bud-
get. Moreover, the Social Security and Medicare calculations reported in the Budget are limited to 
a projection horizon of seventy-ﬁ  ve years and do not include the administration’s own new policy 
recommendations, in contrast to the “policy-inclusive” nature of the rest of the Budget. Social Secu-
rity’s “long-term deﬁ  ciency” is reported as $3.4 trillion and Medicare’s is $13 trillion. Both estimates 
include the programs’ trust funds balances as resources dedicated for those programs. Because of 
the truncated projection horizon (and the non-policy-inclusive nature of the Social Security and 
Medicare projections), these estimates understate considerably the true magnitude of ﬁ  scal imbal-
ance embedded in the Budget’s policies.
More recently, the 2003 Social Security and Medicare Trustees’ report shows seventy-ﬁ  ve-year as 
well as inﬁ  nite-horizon shortfall estimates for that program. The Trustees also reported Social Secu-
rity’s closed-group liability, which is constructed in the same way as the GI concept in this paper. 
The Trustees’ seventy-ﬁ  ve-year shortfall estimate closely approximates the ﬁ  gures reported in the 
Budget. Their inﬁ  nite horizon estimate is $10.5 trillion—larger than that reported here. We suspect 
that this difference is primarily due to the higher discount rate that we use—a rate consistent with 
OMB’s projection of interest rates on long-term Treasury debt. Medicare’s Trustees, however, do not 
provide an inﬁ  nite-horizon estimate of Medicare’s ﬁ  scal imbalance. The estimate of Medicare’s FI 
that we report is almost three times as large as the seventy-ﬁ  ve-year number reported in the Budget. 
28. These comments also 
apply equally to other Budget 
reporting agencies such as the 
Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce, 
Joint Tax Committee, and others 
that employ short-term reporting 
horizons.
27. When asset growth in tax-
deferred plans is evaluated on a 
risk-adjusted basis, however, tax 
deferral costs the government 
money.
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15Our estimate, however, also includes the policy proposals contained in the FY 2004 Budget, includ-
ing the president’s original prescription drug plan.
This paper does not endorse the use of an FI measure calculated over just seventy-ﬁ  ve years. 
However, for comparison with the estimates in the Budget and in the Trustees’ report (both of 
which are based on the Trustees’ economic assumptions and exclude the Budget’s newest policy 
proposals), table 3 shows seventy-ﬁ  ve-year estimates of FI based on policy-inclusive OMB projec-
tions and OMB’s own economic assumptions that it uses in the rest of the Budget. Our estimate of 
the seventy-ﬁ  ve-year FI for Social Security is only $1.6 trillion, compared to $3.4 trillion that was 
reported in the Budget. The difference primarily stems from the higher assumed rate of productiv-
ity growth under the OMB assumptions that we use. Higher productivity growth increases payroll 
tax receipts over the short and medium term and increases Social Security beneﬁ  t outlays over the 
long term. Also OMB’s long-term real discount rate—3.6 percent per year—is about 60 basis points 
higher than that used by the Social Security Trustees. The cumulative effect over a seventy-ﬁ  ve-year 
projection window is to make our seventy-ﬁ  ve-year estimate of Social Security’s FI smaller than that 
reported in the Budget.
By contrast, table 3 shows that our seventy-ﬁ  ve-year $15.1 trillion estimate of Medicare’s FI (using 
OMB assumptions) is larger than the $13 trillion value reported in the Budget. Because of the higher 
discount rate under OMB’s assumptions, our estimate would have been much lower than the Bud-
get’s estimate if we had also excluded the Budget’s newest policy proposals.29 However, the impact 
of new Medicare proposals in the Budget, including the original prescription drug plan, more than 
offset the effect of using a higher discount rate. In general, we conclude that our estimate for Social 
Security’s FI is more conservative than ofﬁ  cial estimates. Medicare’s FI would also be smaller but for 
the impact of new Medicare policies proposed in the Budget.
Comparison of FI with Present Values of Payroll, GDP, and Other Aggregates
Another way to assess the magnitude of total federal FI is to compare it to the present value of future 
GDP or future payrolls. Table 4 shows that as of the end of ﬁ  scal year 2002, total FI equaled 6.5 percent 
of the present value of all future GDP and about 16.6 percent of the present value of future capped 
payrolls. So, for example, restoring a balanced ﬁ  scal policy could, in theory, be accomplished with 
an immediate and permanent wage tax increase of 16.6 percentage points. If we instead choose to 
eliminate FI by increasing federal income taxes, those revenues would have to be increased by an-
other two-thirds. Alternatively, table 4 shows that future Social Security and Medicare outlays would 
have to be permanently lowered by 45 percent or non–Social Security and non-Medicare outlays 
would have to be cut by 54.8 percent immediately and forever. Alternatively, eliminating the entire 
SEVENTY-FIVE-YEAR FISCAL IMBALANCES
(Present values in billions of constant 2002 dollars; ﬁ  scal year-end)
TABLE 3
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
75-year Fiscal Imbalance—U.S. federal government 16,315 17,101 17,943 18,889 19,900 20,966 22,097
Social Security 1,596 1,689 1,804 1,932 2,072 2,224 2,389
Medicare 15,080 15,676 16,631 17,102 17,868 18,672 19,518
Rest of federal government –360 –264 –222 –145 –41 70 190
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
29. OMB did not provide projections 
excluding the administration’s 
latest Budget proposals.
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16federal discretionary budget immediately and permanently would still fall about $1.8 trillion short 
of achieving ﬁ  scal sustainability. Such tax hikes or spending cuts would obviously be devastating to 
the economy. However, the alternative of waiting to make the adjustment is worse: Waiting until just 
2008 to introduce corrective policies would require an immediate and permanent wage tax hike 
of 18.2 percentage points rather than 16.6 percentage points, or a 73.7 percent increase in income 
tax revenues instead of 68.5 percent. If the entire adjustment were made by cutting non–Social 
Security and non-Medicare outlays, they would have to be reduced by 59.8 percent in 2008 instead 
of 54.8 percent today.
Sensitivity to Alternative Assumptions 
Federal revenue and outlay projections—and, hence, the values of FI and GI—obviously depend on 
the underlying assumptions. This section reports the sensitivity of FI to variations in three key un-
derlying parameters: the government’s long-term annual discount rate (r); the annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita (g); and the differential (h) between the annual growth rate of outlays on Medicare 
and Medicaid per capita and g. The differential, h, however, only exists until 2080. Between 2080 and 
2100, the annual growth rate of outlays on Medicare and Medicaid per capita is gradually reduced to 
g so that the differential, h, becomes zero, where it remains after 2100. As a result, health-care outlays 
per capita (distinguished by age and sex) grow no faster than GDP after 2100. These projections of 
TABLE 4 TOTAL FISCAL IMBALANCE AS A SHARE OF PRESENT VALUES OF 
PAYROLL, GDP, AND VARIOUS OUTLAYS
(Present values in billions of constant 2002 dollars; ﬁ  scal year-end)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Fiscal Imbalance (FI) 44,214 45,470 46,930 48,548 50,265 52,064 53,962
PV payroll base 265,646 272,027 275,398 280,161 285,399 290,918 296,641
Total FI as a percent of PV of payroll  16.6 16.7 17.0 17.3 17.6 17.9 18.2
PV of income taxes  64,564 65,593 66,995 68,474 70,005 71,561 73,181
Total FI as a percent of PV of income 
taxes 
68.5 69.3 70.1 70.9 71.8 72.8 73.7
PV of payroll taxes plus taxes on Social 
Security beneﬁ  ts 
47,038 47,655 48,517 49,456 50,451 51,482 52,565
Total FI as a percent of payroll 
taxes plus taxes on Social Security 
beneﬁ  ts
94.0 95.4 96.7 98.2 99.6 101.1 102.7
PV of discretionary outlays 42,458 42,884 43,533 44,260 45,045 45,875 46,752
Total FI as a percent of PV of 
discretionary outlays 
104.1* 106.0* 107.8* 109.7* 111.6* 113.5* 115.4*
PV of Social Security and Medicare 
outlays 
97,666 99,675 102,234 105,022 107,959 111,017 114,232
PV of FI as a percent of Social 
Security and Medicare outlays
45.3 45.6 45.9 46.2 46.6 46.9 47.2
PV of Non-Social Security and non-
Medicare outlays
80,676 81,701 83,161 84,780 86,503 88,307 90,202
Total FI as a percent of non-Social 
Security and Non-Medicare outlays
54.8 55.7 56.4 57.3 58.1 59.0 59.8
PV of GDP  682,156 699,070 708,187 720,896 734,861 749,573 764,811
Total FI as a percent of PV of GDP  6.5 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.1
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
* The number exceeds 100, implying that eliminating all discretionary spending immediately and forever would be sufﬁ  cient to 
achieve a sustainable ﬁ  scal policy (i.e., FI = 0).
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17entitlement outlay growth cause the share of Medicare and Social Security spending in GDP to rise 
from 7.6 percent in 2002 to 13.1 percent by 2080. Under the baseline set of assumptions correspond-
ing to results presented earlier, r=3.6, g=1.7, h =1 percent. We now consider two alternative values—
low and high—for each parameter. The low and high values for r are 3.3 and 3.9 percent; those for g 
are 1.2 and 2.2 percent; and those for h are 0.5 and 1.5 percent.30
Table 5 shows that the FI for ﬁ  scal-year-end 2002 is quite sensitive to the discount rate assump-
tion: FI is estimated to be $34.6 trillion under the high discount rate assumption (r = 3.9 percent), 
whereas it is $58.6 trillion when the assumed discount rate is low (r = 3.3 percent).31 The high 
sensitivity of FI to the different values of r is not surprising. Notice, for example, that the baseline 
total FI is almost three times larger than the truncated seventy-ﬁ  ve-year estimate (see tables 2 and 
3), suggesting that annual imbalances are projected to grow considerably beyond the seventy-ﬁ  fth 
year. This high projected growth of annual imbalances in the distant future causes the FI to be very 
sensitive to variations in the assumed discount rate.
To understand the sensitivity of FI to the discount rate, consider, for example, two different time 
series of annual imbalances. Assume that both series are initially equal in present value at a given 
discount rate. By the process of compound interest, a change in the discount rate alters the discount 
factor applicable to values further in time by more than those nearer in time. Hence, between these 
two time series, the one that exhibits growing annual imbalances will be more sensitive to discount 
rate changes than the one that is stable over time. Therefore, the high sensitivity of FI to changes 
in the discount rate indicates that projected annual ﬁ  nancial shortfalls continue to grow over time. 
Hence, the sensitivity of FI only conﬁ  rms the inappropriateness of using short-term ﬁ  scal measures or 
measures based on an arbitrarily truncated projection to assess the extent of policy unsustainability.
Turning now to the productivity growth rate assumption, g, table 5 also shows that the total 
FI is $55.9 trillion under the high growth rate assumption (g = 2.2 percent). Social Security’s FI 
increases from $7 trillion under baseline assumptions to $12 trillion under the high growth rate 
assumption.32 Medicare’s FI increases from $36.6 trillion to $66.1 trillion because greater produc-
tivity growth also occurs in the Medicare sector (that is, the differential, h, is unchanged). However, 
TABLE 5 SENSITIVITY OF FISCAL IMBALANCE (2002) TO DISCOUNT RATE AND 
GROWTH ASSUMPTIONS
(Present values in billions of constant 2002 dollars; ﬁ  scal year-end)
Baseline 
assumptions Discount  rate 
GDP growth per 
capita
Health-care 
outlay growth per 
capita
High Low High Low High Low 
Total Fiscal Imbalance—U.S. 
federal government
44,214 34,564 58,608 55,892 36,908 63,930 29,450
Social Security  7,022 5,025 9,978 11,975 4,933 7,022 7,022
Medicare 36,643 28,910 47,962 66,071 23,194 50,035 26,644
Rest of federal government  550 629 668 –22,153 8,781 6,874 –4,215
Present value of excess of 
outlays over receipts 
–4,587 –4,508 –4,470 –27,290 3,644 1,737 –9,352
Liability to Social Security 
and Medicare 
1,597 1,597 1,597 1,597 1,597 1,597 1,597
Debt held by the public  3,540 3,540 3,540 3,540 3,540 3,540 3,540
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
30. An increase in g does not 
necessarily have the same impact 
as an equal decline in r because 
higher growth does not necessar-
ily imply higher outlays in every 
category. For example, higher 
growth is likely to result in lower 
social welfare outlays. Hence, we 
show below the sensitivity of FI 
estimates to variations in r and g 
separately.
31. We consider the sensitivity of 
each parameter relative to the 
baseline set of parameters. 
Future work could extend this 
analysis by considering 
different parameter combinations 
together with the probability of 
each combination in order to 
create a distribution of possible 
outcomes.
32. The increase in Social Security’s 
FI seems counterintuitive at 
ﬁ  rst glance, because faster 
future productivity growth does 
not affect the real value of 
existing retirees’ beneﬁ  ts. Rather, 
payroll tax revenues increase 
immediately, but beneﬁ  ts rise only 
gradually as faster wage growth 
(stemming from the assumed 
faster productivity growth) is 
incorporated in calculating future 
retirees’ beneﬁ  ts. To understand 
why Social Security’s FI 
increases in value, suppose that 
in response to faster productiv-
ity growth, the payroll tax base, 
payroll tax revenues, and outlays 
doubled. The imbalance between 
outlays and revenues would 
also double. However, if, more 
realistically, outlay increases 
were delayed by a few years, 
the imbalance would increase to 
less than twice its original size. 
We discuss below how the total 
FI changes relative to payroll tax 
base and other measures as we 
change the underlying economic 
assumptions.
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18for the rest of government, faster productivity growth also brings in more general revenue and 
reduces the outlays on Medicaid, unemployment compensation, and various welfare programs. As a 
result, the rest-of-federal-government’s FI shifts from $0.5 trillion under the baseline to minus $22.2 
trillion. Nevertheless, across all government programs, the net effect of higher productivity is to 
increase total FI relative to its value under baseline assumptions.
Conversely, lower assumed productivity growth (g = 1.2 percent) reduces Social Security and 
Medicare’s imbalances, but increases the imbalance on account of the rest of the federal govern-
ment. The resulting total FI is $36.9 trillion, which is smaller than the $44.2 trillion baseline value.
The impact on FI of alternatively assuming higher- and lower-than-baseline growth rates in 
federal health-care spending is more substantial. Under the high-h assumption (h = 1.5 percent), 
FI is $63.9 trillion, whereas it comes in at just $29.5 trillion under the low-h assumption (h = 0.5 
percent).33 Under the high-h assumption, annual health-care costs per capita are assumed to grow 
at 1.5 percentage points above the annual GDP per capita growth rate until 2080—an assumption 
that is actually quite plausible when compared with experience during the previous two decades 
when, as noted earlier, we witnessed an annual differential of 2.3 percentage points. Under the low-
h assumption, however, health-care costs are assumed to grow at just 0.5 percentage point above 
GDP, an assumption that strikes us as fairly unlikely. In both cases, between 2080 and 2100, the dif-
ferential is reduced to zero where it stays forever—an assumption that is clearly conservative by 
historical standards.
The ratio of FI to the present values of payroll and GDP, however, exhibits greater stability than 
the present value constant 2002 dollar amounts in response to changes in the various parameter 
values because the denominator—the present value of future payrolls or GDP—changes in the 
same direction as total FI. In other words, while the dollar value of the Fiscal Imbalance is sensitive 
to the underlying assumptions, the size of the tax rate increase or percent decrease in spending 
required to achieve sustainability is much less sensitive.
Table 6 shows that under baseline assumptions, the total FI is 16.6 percent of the present value 
of the (uncapped) payroll tax base as of ﬁ  scal-year-end 2002. Under high and low productivity 
growth assumptions, it is 14.8 and 18 percent, respectively. Recall that, as reported earlier, the total 
FI is larger in present-value dollar terms under the high productivity growth assumption. In contrast, 
it is actually smaller as a share of the present value of future payrolls relative to the baseline. The 
reason is that FI grows proportionally less than the payroll base because of larger rest-of-govern-
ment receipts and smaller outlay growth for some expenditure categories.
Under the high and low health-care growth assumptions, the variation in the ratio of FI to the 
present value of payrolls is wider—between 24.1 and 11.1 percent, respectively. This variation is not 
so surprising given the 100 basis point difference per year between our high- and low-cost health-
TABLE 6 SENSITIVITY OF TOTAL FISCAL IMBALANCE (FISCAL-YEAR-END 2002) AS 




Discount rate 16.6 15.0 18.8
Productivity growth per capita 16.6 14.8 18.0
Health-care outlay growth per capita  16.6 24.1 11.1
33. Notice that Medicare’s FI is 
actually larger under the high-g 
assumption relative to the high-h 
assumption even though the 
assumed growth rate of future 
health, g plus h, is identical under 
both assumptions. The reason 
is that we follow OMB rules and 
begin the high-g assumption in 
2003 while starting the high-h 
assumption in 2014.
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19care growth rate assumptions, which produces a large compounded difference over time. These 
numbers show that an immediate and permanent 11.1 percentage point tax increase on all wages is 
needed to return U.S. ﬁ  scal policy system to sustainability even under very optimistic assumptions 
about growth in health-care costs per capita.
Conclusion
The federal government’s spending priorities are set to change over the coming decades as the 
baby boom generation retires: future federal outlays will predominantly consist of social insurance 
payments. In such a budget environment, traditional measures such as debt held by the public, ﬁ  ve- 
or ten-year-ahead cash-ﬂ  ow deﬁ  cit projections, and longer-term but truncated summary measures 
have limited usefulness for policymaking. Indeed, continuing to focus on such measures is likely to 
sustain a policy bias that favors short-term debt reduction over policies that would be beneﬁ  cial 
in addressing the nation’s true longer-term ﬁ  scal imbalance. To evaluate and compare all available 
policy alternatives on a neutral footing, we need to introduce new ﬁ  scal measures as part of our ﬁ  s-
cal vocabulary.
The FI and GI measures proposed here possess several desirable properties. The main effect of 
adopting them would be to place the debate on entitlement reform on a neutral basis. These mea-
sures would provide policymakers with a powerful tool for analyzing the long-term ﬁ  nancial health 
of the federal government: The FI measure informs us about the extent of the federal government’s 
long-term insolvency, and the GI measure provides a metric for choosing among alternative sustain-
able policies to strike an acceptable balance between the costs imposed on different generations. 
The GI measure could also be augmented with other, more detailed measures of the impact of ﬁ  scal 
policies across population subgroups.
Based on OMB’s policy-inclusive budget projections, the federal government’s long-term Fiscal 
Imbalance is $44.2 trillion as of ﬁ  scal-year-end 2002. This is the amount of resources in present value 
that the government must produce, either by cutting spending or increasing revenues, in order to 
put the nation’s ﬁ  scal policies on a sustainable path. This value is more than ten times as large as the 
size of debt currently held by the public; it is also several times larger than similar values published 
elsewhere under a seventy-ﬁ  ve-year projection horizon. To fully eliminate the existing FI, wage 
taxes, for example, would have to be increased by 16.6 percentage points forever. Eliminating all 
discretionary spending immediately and forever would fall short by $1.8 trillion.
To be sure, the dollar value of the FI is sensitive to underlying growth and discount rate assump-
tions. But this occurs because of the rapid growth in projected ﬁ  nancial shortfalls—which only 
reinforces the case for reporting the perpetuity FI measure rather than a truncated seventy-ﬁ  ve-year 
measure. The ratio of the FI to the tax base or GDP—and, hence, the size of alternative ﬁ  scal reforms 
to achieve solvency—is much less sensitive to changes in these economic assumptions since the 
tax base and GDP tend to respond in the same direction as FI.
We remain optimistic about the potential for further reform in federal Budget accounting. Posi-
tive changes have already occurred in the ofﬁ  cial reporting of the long-term ﬁ  nancial status of Social 
Security and Medicare: The Social Security Trustees have adopted the FI and GI measures for that 
program along with other changes including stochastic analysis. We hope that the Trustees will soon 
begin ofﬁ  cially reporting these measures for Medicare, and that CBO and OMB will begin reporting 
these measures for the rest of the federal government as well. 
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Derivation of the Inﬁ  nite Horizon Fiscal Imbalance Measure
The derivations refer to any program with dedicated resources such as Social Security and Medi-
care. Subtract the actuarial present value of the program’s projected revenues and the inherited 
value of the program’s assets from the actuarial present value of projected outlays [see equation 1 
in the text]. If present values are calculated in perpetuity, the residual represents the Fiscal Imbal-
ance (FI) measure:




b,t ] – Γ-1 R-1,
where βx
b,t represents period-t outlays per capita and  τx
b,t  represents period-t taxes per capita on 
persons of sex x ( = m or f ) born in period b, both in inﬂ  ation adjusted terms, and  p
x
b,t represents 
the population in period t of such individuals. The discount factor R equals 1/(1+r), where r is the 
per-period real interest rate and Γ-1 denotes the trust fund inherited in period 0 (its value at the end 
of period t = –1). The necessary condition for the program to be actuarially solvent in perpetuity 
(but not necessarily solvent in each period if trust fund borrowing is prohibited) is FI0 ≤ 0. 
How this measure changes over time under given projections of beneﬁ  ts, outlays, and demo-
graphics can be seen by decomposing the ﬁ  rst term into two parts—the current deﬁ  cit and the 
present value of future deﬁ  cits. Doing so yields:









b,t ] – Γ−1 R–1.
Manipulate equation (A2)—add and subtract Γ0 and use the relation










b,t  ] – Γ-1 R-1}
   = R · FI1.
Thus, under given tax and beneﬁ  t projections, the time series of FI grows at the rate of interest. 
If FI0= 0, equation (A4) implies that all terms in the FIt time series equal 0. Hence, this measure 
exhibits a knife-edge characteristic:  Absent changes in projections and policy, if the government 
program being considered is just actuarially solvent initially, it stays so through time. However, if FI 
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The right-hand-side of equation (A1) can be broken down in another way—according to cohort-
speciﬁ  c present values of beneﬁ  ts net of payroll taxes. This is done by distinguishing between the 
cohort of those alive today (which includes those born ∆ periods ago through period-0 newborns) 
and the cohort of past generations (those no longer alive). The inherited assets of the program en-
compass the excess of past payments by both groups. This measure is calculated as the present val-
ue of beneﬁ  ts received by those currently alive minus the present value of their taxes and minus 
the inherited trust fund:   




b,t] – Γ-1 R-1}





where the term in curly brackets is GI0. Expanding this term into current ﬂ  ows and the present val-
ue of future ﬂ  ows, and expanding the second term into the present values of beneﬁ  ts minus taxes 
of those born in period 1 and those born in periods 2 and later, we get,









b,t] – Γ-1 R-1









Manipulate equation (A6) as earlier [add and subtract Γ0 and use equation (A3)] to get




b,t  ] – Γ0 R–1}





Hence, the relationship between the GI terms [the terms in curly brackets in equations (A5) and 
(A7)] can be expressed as
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22or
(A9a)   NT1 = GI1 – (GI0 / R),




b,t ]—the net transfer to the cohort born in period 
b. Equation (A9) says that the difference between GI0 and the discounted value of GI1 is equal to 
the discounted net transfer to the generation born in period 1. Rewriting equation (A9) after shift-
ing the time index ahead by one period yields
(A10)   R · GI2 – GI1 = R · NT2 . 
Hence, it is easy to deduce that
(A11)   Rn · GIn – GI0 = Σ  Rs · NTs . 
In general, the difference between appropriately discounted GI measures equals the total net trans-
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23Appendix B:  Assumptions and Methods for Estimating Fiscal Imbalances for 
Social Security, Medicare, and the Rest of the Federal Budget
The assumptions and methods used to estimate the measures of ﬁ  scal imbalance presented in this 
paper were ﬁ  rst developed in connection with generational accounting. They have been updated 
and integrated with OMB’s budget projections to compute the ﬁ  scal imbalance measures reported 
here. The techniques described below are used to estimate how federal program beneﬁ  ts are dis-
tributed and, for the period beyond OMB’s projection horizon, to project the growth of total federal 
outlays and receipts.
Method of Extending the Social Security Administration’s Population Projections
Population projections are extended beyond the last year for which the Social Security Administra-
tion (SSA) provides projections (the year 2080). SSA’s terminal-year fertility, immigration, and mortal-
ity assumptions are used. The following method is employed in extending the projections:  
First, the population of newborns for 2081 is obtained by applying the terminal-year female 
fertility rates by age to the population of females in 2080. The resulting births are split into male 
and female newborns applying the historical norm of male births to total births. This ratio equals 
0.5122. Next, the 2080 population of individuals aged 0 year through 99 years is aged by one year 
to obtain the 2081 population aged 1 through 99 and the addition to the 100-and-older population. 
This process involves applying age-sex mortality rates and immigration counts to the 2080 popula-
tion. The SSA procedure assumes that immigration remains constant in absolute terms after about 
two decades.  
The survival probabilities, mortality rates and immigration counts through 2080 are those under 
SSA’s intermediate assumptions. Mortality rates for years after 2080 are estimated using SSA’s pro-
jection methodology. This methodology adjusts each future year’s mortality rates by age and sex 
according to a cause-of-death-speciﬁ  c rate of decline in the death rate weighted by the number of 
deaths by cause of death. The annual decline in mortality rates by cause of death is assumed to be 
constant.  
Finally, the evolution of the age 100-plus population is estimated. The survival rate for “100-year-
olds” is computed as follows:  The “100-year-old” population is the sum of those aged 100 and more. 
As a ﬁ  rst approximation, it is assumed their population is divided between ages 100 through 119, 
in the same proportion as their cumulative survival probabilities to particular ages within that in-
terval conditional on having survived to age 100.  The fraction of 100-year-olds that survive equals 
1 minus the product of their population proportions between age 101 and 119 and mortality rates 
applicable at these ages. The procedure detailed here is applied repeatedly to derive each succes-
sive year’s population projection beyond 2080—for as long as needed. A more precise description 
of this procedure is given in appendix C.
Method for Projecting Social Security Revenues and Beneﬁ  ts
Social Security’s payroll tax revenues are distributed by age and sex using age-sex relative proﬁ  les of 
payroll tax payments obtained from the CPS (March 2001). The proﬁ  le is constructed after impos-
ing a taxable earnings limit on survey respondent’s wages, salaries, and self-employment earnings. 
These age sex proﬁ  les are used to distribute OMB’s projected payroll tax revenues plus revenue 
POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 5, DECEMBER 2003
24from taxation of beneﬁ  ts as separate age-sex proﬁ  les are not available to distribute these two cate-
gories of revenue separately. For years beyond OMB’s terminal projection year, per-capita payroll tax 
payments are incremented at the rate of GDP growth per capita—1.7 percent per year.
Social Security beneﬁ  t rules in effect today are not static. Current rules schedule a gradual in-
crease in the normal or full retirement age (FRA) beginning in 2003 that has already begun to affect 
the beneﬁ  ts of some individuals who have decided to retire and collect beneﬁ  ts early. The already 
scheduled increases in FRA will not be completed until the third decade of this century. Because of 
the scheduled increase in FRA, the latest available age-sex Social Security beneﬁ  t proﬁ  le cannot be 
applied to distribute projected Social Security beneﬁ  ts during the next few decades. The proﬁ  le ap-
plicable to the year 2000 must be adjusted to take into account the projected reduction in beneﬁ  ts 
of those who begin to collect beneﬁ  ts prior to attaining their applicable FRA. A detailed adjustment 
procedure is developed to estimate changes in age-sex proﬁ  le for future years. The adjustment proce-
dure uses data published by the Social Security Administration in its Annual Statistical Supplement 
to the Social Security Bulletin. That publication reports the number or retirees by age and sex and 
the average beneﬁ  ts received by age and sex for several different types of Social Security beneﬁ  ts.  
Data from years 2000 and 2001 is used to estimate the fraction of new retiree, widow(er), and 
dependent beneﬁ  ciaries at each age and by sex—the types of beneﬁ  ts that are subject to reduction 
for collection at ages earlier than the applicable FRA. New beneﬁ  ciaries at each age and sex are 
calculated as the number of beneﬁ  ciaries in the second year minus those in the same beneﬁ  ciary 
cohort in the previous year (who are one year younger) and minus those among the same cohort 
who have died within the year.  
In addition, data from 2001 is used to estimate age-sex proﬁ  les of average retirement, widow(er) 
and dependent beneﬁ  ts relative to other beneﬁ  ts—those not subject to reduction for early collec-
tion (such as mother and father beneﬁ  ts and beneﬁ  ts for dependents who care for children etc.). 
In addition the fraction of the population at each age and sex who collected beneﬁ  ts in 2001 has 
been calculated. These frequencies of beneﬁ  t collection, fraction of new beneﬁ  ciaries, and average 
beneﬁ  ts at each age and sex are combined with Social Security’s beneﬁ  t reduction formulae for 
early collection of retirement, widower, and dependents’ beneﬁ  ts to estimate the changes in age-sex 
proﬁ  les in each successive year. The calculations indicate that the transition from the currently pre-
vailing relative beneﬁ  t proﬁ  le to those that will prevail once the higher FRA has been fully phased 
in (by 2023) will be completed within a few decades thereafter. Hence, the procedure to adjust 
relative proﬁ  les for increasing FRA is carried forward until the year 2080. Appendix D documents 
the precise adjustment procedure for each type of beneﬁ  t that is subject to an early retirement 
reduction.
All the beneﬁ  t data are from 2000 and 2001. Estimating the relative decline in beneﬁ  ts at all ages 
and by sex in future years does not yield the per capita beneﬁ  t levels at each age and sex in those 
future years. Each future year’s age-sex Social Security beneﬁ  t proﬁ  le is derived from data from 2000 
and 2001 and is normalized by dividing every value by that applicable to a forty-year-old male in 
that year. This yields the desired relative proﬁ  les of beneﬁ  ts by age and sex. To calculate beneﬁ  ts per 
capita, these relative proﬁ  les are used to distribute the projected Social Security beneﬁ  ts applicable 
to corresponding years in the future. 
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year 2030’s projected population and relative proﬁ  le values by age and sex yields the number of 
units into which 2030’s projected aggregate beneﬁ  t must be divided to yield the per-capita beneﬁ  t 
of a forty-year-old male. The product of this per-capita value with other age-sex relative beneﬁ  t val-
ues yields the per-capita beneﬁ  ts at those age sex values for 2030. This calculation is implemented 
for each year for which OMB projections are available to obtain beneﬁ  ts per capita at each age and 
sex in these years. 
The proﬁ  le of beneﬁ  ts per-capita by age and sex calculated for OMB’s terminal projection year 
is multiplied by a growth factor to obtain successive years’ beneﬁ  t levels. The growth rate applied 
equals 1.7 percent—OMB’s real GDP growth per capita in the terminal year. This procedure is de-
tailed in appendix E.
Methodology for Projecting Medicare Revenues and Outlays
Medicare Part A revenues are distributed by age and sex according to relative wages by age and 
sex. Average wages by age and sex are estimated from the Current Population Survey’s (CPS) March 
2001 supplement that contains data for the year 2000. Relative wage proﬁ  les by age and sex are 
obtained by normalizing average wages by age and sex to those of forty-year-old males. The relative 
proﬁ  le for distributing Medicare Part B premiums is the distribution by age and sex of Medicare ben-
eﬁ  t recipiency relative to the total population by age and sex—also estimated from the CPS.  
The relative proﬁ  le of Medicare (Parts A and B) outlays is constructed using SSA’s population 
projections and coefﬁ  cients of relative Medicare expenditures in Lee, Skinner, and McClellan (1999). 
Lee, Skinner, and McClellan provide estimates of Medicare beneﬁ  ts received by age and sex. Sepa-
rate estimates are provided for those who survive for at least one year after the current year (“survi-
vors”) and on those who die within the year (“decedents”). The proﬁ  les of beneﬁ  ts by age and sex 
normalized to those of a sixty-ﬁ  ve-year-old male survivor are constructed from these data. 
Medicare Part A and B outlays for those aged sixty-ﬁ  ve and older are modeled as the sum of 
average outlays times the number of individuals in the two survivorship categories mentioned 
above:  SSA’s population projections are used to determine the number of individuals in these two 
categories at all ages and for both sexes in every future year. Projected Medicare expenditures on 
the elderly through OMB’s terminal projection year are distributed across their populations in these 
years using the aforementioned relative beneﬁ  t proﬁ  les. 
For those aged sixty-four and younger (mostly disabled individuals and eligible survivors), ben-
eﬁ  ts per capita are calculated by distributing their share of Medicare outlays according to their rela-
tive beneﬁ  t proﬁ  les by age and sex. These average beneﬁ  ts by age and sex are also obtained from 
Lee, McClellan, and Skinner (1999).
The shares of Medicare expenditures on the young and the elderly are obtained by applying to 
projected total Medicare outlays the projected share of expenditures on those aged sixty-four and 
younger. This share is provided by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce (CBO) through 2070 and is ex-
trapolated through 2080 according to its trend between 2061 and 2070. 
For years beyond OMB’s terminal projection year, the terminal year’s per capita beneﬁ  ts are ex-
tended by applying two growth factors. The ﬁ  rst factor equals an assumed growth rate of per-capita 
Medicare beneﬁ  ts at a rate equal to the rate of labor productivity growth—1.7 percent per year. 
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through time in the number of retirees by age and sex that are projected to die within one year 
relative to those projected to survive for more than a year. The precise details of the procedure are 
documented in appendix F.
Estimating Fiscal Imbalance for the Rest of the Federal Government
The ﬁ  scal imbalance measure for the “rest of federal government” used OMB projections extended 
beyond their terminal year using the procedure described below.
Distributing and Projecting Federal Outlays
For those years where outlay projections are available, outlays are distributed by age and sex across 
the populations alive in corresponding years. The SSA’s extended population projections are used in 
doing so (see the section describing the method for extending SSA’s population projections). 
The method for distributing federal outlays distinguishes between two types:  Outlays that are 
not intended to beneﬁ  t a speciﬁ  c subset of the population and those that are. The ﬁ  rst category 
includes items such as national defense, the administration of justice, international affairs, etc. Such 
items are distributed equally across the entire population in corresponding years for which aggre-
gate projections are available.
Yet other federal outlays provide direct payments to individuals—by way of income support, 
educational subsidies, child-care beneﬁ  ts, health and retirement beneﬁ  ts, etc. These outlays are dis-
tributed by age and sex according to age-sex relative proﬁ  les constructed from micro-data sources 
that are publicly available—such as Survey of Income and Program Participation, the Current 
Population Survey, the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, etc.  Outlay aggregates distributed in this 
manner include federal civilian retirement, federal employee life insurance, railroad retirement, vet-
erans’ beneﬁ  ts, D.C. pension fund, supplemental security income, workers’ compensation, military 
retirement, unemployment compensation, general assistance, Women, Infants and Children, food 
stamps, Medicaid, child care, coal miners’ beneﬁ  ts, earned income credit, and child tax credit outlays. 
Federal outlay aggregates by category are distributed by age and sex for years 2003-80—the years 
for which projected aggregate outlays are available. Beyond 2080, outlays per capita by age and sex 
are projected by applying a per-capita growth rate to each age-sex value and summed across the 
projected populations for future years.  
Distributing and Projecting Federal Revenues 
The method for distributing federal revenue aggregates is similar to that of distributing federal out-
lays. OMB projections are used through the terminal year of those projections. The projections are 
extended beyond that year using the following procedures. In general, age-sex relative proﬁ  les are 
estimated from micro-data surveys (the Current Population Survey, the Survey of Consumer Financ-
es, and the Consumer Expenditure Survey). In each case, weighted averages are calculated for each 
item and the age-sex proﬁ  les are smoothed using age-centered moving averages.  
Relative proﬁ  les and population projections are used to distribute OMB’s projected revenue ag-
gregates. Beyond the terminal year of those projections, tax payments per capita are obtained by ap-
plying a per-capita growth factor to the OMB terminal year per capita amounts and summed across 
age and sex after weighting with the corresponding year’s population for each age-sex category. 
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on labor income and those on capital income. The division is done according to the estimated share 
of labor income in net national income averaged over the years 1990-2001. Labor income taxes are 
distributed using the age-sex wage proﬁ  le obtained from the CPS for the year 2001, and modiﬁ  ed 
by the age-sex relative proﬁ  le of average tax rates, also estimated from the CPS. Similarly the sum 
of capital income taxes and corporate taxes is distributed according to a relative proﬁ  le of wealth 
holdings by age and sex estimated from the Survey of Consumer Finances. The wealth proﬁ  le is also 
modiﬁ  ed by the CPS-derived relative proﬁ  le of average tax-rates by age and sex.  
Social insurance contributions on account of railroad retirement and federal civilian retirement 
are distributed using age-sex relative proﬁ  les estimated from the CPS. Employer-paid unemployment 
insurance taxes are distributed according to the CPS relative wage proﬁ  le. Excise taxes and customs 
duties are distributed according to the relative age-sex distribution of consumption estimated from 
the Consumer Expenditure Survey (see next section for a description).  
Estate and gift taxes are distributed by age and sex according to the SCF wealth proﬁ  le modi-
ﬁ  ed by the probability of death by age and sex in each future year. Age and sex speciﬁ  c projected 
mortality rates are used for each future year to implement the modiﬁ  cation. This modiﬁ  cation of 
wealth holdings by age and sex yields the relative age-sex proﬁ  le of decedent’s wealth. Finally, the 
category of ‘miscellaneous receipts’ is distributed equally across the population through OMB’s 
terminal projection year.
Estimating Consumption Proﬁ  les by Age and Sex
The Consumer Expenditure Survey consists of two components, a quarterly Interview Survey and a 
weekly Diary Survey, each with its own questionnaire and sample. For the most part, these two sur-
veys cover different expenditure items, but there is some overlap. An internal procedure provided 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics is used to generate a unique list of expenditures. This procedure is 
adjusted to allocate expenditure items between male and female household members, and between 
adults and children deﬁ  ned as members aged sixteen through eighteen. Because these proﬁ  les are 
to be used to distribute excise and customs taxes, no expenditures are allocated to children aged 
ﬁ  fteen or younger. 
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Population Projections
Population projections are extended beyond SSA’s projection horizon (the year 2080) using SSA’s 
terminal-year fertility, immigration, and mortality assumptions. The following methodology is used 
to extend the projections. 
Let p
x
b,t stand for the year-t population of individuals of sex x (= m, f) born in period b (b = 
t,…t−100). Values of p
x
b,t , t=2002…2080, are provided by SSA. Each year’s value of p
x
b,t  for “100-year-
olds” (b = t−100) includes the population of those who are aged 100 or more. 
To extend the population projections to t = 2081, we ﬁ  rst obtain the population of newborns. 
This is done by applying the terminal-year female age-speciﬁ  c fertility rates fa to the population of 
females, p
f
b,2080 , b = 0…100. The resulting births are split into male and female newborns applying 
the historical norm of male newborns to total newborns α = p
m
t,t  /( p
m
t,t  +  p
f
t,t ) = 0.5122. This yields 
the populations of newborn males and females in 2081: 
(C1)      p
m




(C2)   p 
f
2081,2081  =  (1 — α) · Σ    f2080-b· p
f
b,2080 .
Next, the 2081 population of individuals older than newborns is obtained by applying mortality 
rates by age and sex, δx
a,t, a = 0,...100; x = m,f and SSA’s terminal immigration rates by age and sex,   
βx
a, a = 0,...100, to the previous year’s population. Thus,
(C3)   p
x
b,2081 = (1 + βx
2080-b
) · (1 +  δx
2080-b,2081
 ) · p
x
b,2080, 
        x = m, f;  b = 1981,…2080.
The mortality rates δx
a,t, a = 0,...100; x = m,f  for t > 2080 are projected using SSA’s mortality rates 
by age, sex, and cause of death. Mortality rates are assumed to decline at SSA’s cause-of-death-speciﬁ  c 
annual rates of decline by age and sex.
The survival rate for “100-year-olds” is computed as follows:  The “100-year-old” population is the 
sum of those aged 100 and more. As a ﬁ  rst approximation, it is assumed their population is divided 
between ages 100 through 119, in the same proportion as their cumulative survival probabilities to 
particular ages within that interval conditional on having survived to age 100. Hence, it is assumed 
that there are 1/S 100-year-olds, (1−δ100)/S 101-year-olds, (1−δ100)* (1−δ101)/S 102-year-olds, etc., 
where S is the sum of terms 1, (1−δ100), (1−δ100) (1−δ101), …etc. The fraction of 100-year-olds that 
survive is, of course, (1−δ100).  Hence (1−δ100)/S 100-year-olds survive; (1−δ100) (1−δ101)/S 101-year-
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π    (1−δs)
The values of  δx
a, a = 0,…100 are taken from SSA’s sex-speciﬁ  c mortality table for 2080.
This procedure [equations (C1) through (C4)] is applied successively to generate population   
projections through the year 3500.  
Assumptions and Deﬁ  nitions
Fertility. Terminal-year female fertility by age is assumed to remain constant. Newborns are split by 
sex using the rule of 105 males per 205 births.
Immigration: Levels of legal and illegal immigration are assumed to remain constant.
Mortality: Weighted average of SSA’s terminal year mortality rates by cause of death.  Mortality rates 
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Social Security Age-Sex Beneﬁ  t Proﬁ  les
Current Social Security beneﬁ  t eligibility rules specify prospective increases in the full retirement 
age (FRA)—the age of eligibility to unreduced beneﬁ  ts. This implies that age-sex beneﬁ  t proﬁ  les de-
rived from past data on the distribution of beneﬁ  ts per capita are not appropriate for distributing 
future projected beneﬁ  t outlays by age and sex. This appendix describes the adjustments made to 
retirement, widow(er) and dependent beneﬁ  t proﬁ  les based on the Social Security Administration’s 
published data on average beneﬁ  ts and number of beneﬁ  ciaries for 1999 and 2000. 
Additional Widow(er) Reductions at Ages 60–61 to Adjust Proﬁ  les for Advancing FRA
  βa,t =   





  βa,t =  Social Security beneﬁ  ts per capita for people aged a in period t
 B a,t = total Social Security beneﬁ  ts for people aged a in period t
 P a,t = total population of beneﬁ  ciaries aged a in period t
 β w
a,t  = average widow(er) beneﬁ  ts for beneﬁ  ciaries aged a in period t
 
β0
a,t  = average “other” [non-widow(er)] beneﬁ  ts for beneﬁ  ciaries aged a in period t
   pw
a,t  = population of widow(er) beneﬁ  ciaries aged a in period t
 p 0
a,t  = population of  “other” beneﬁ  ciaries aged a in period t
The Annual Statistical Supplement (ASS) contains data on beneﬁ  ts by type of beneﬁ  t, age, and sex. 
Using data for t−1 = 1999 and t = 2000, compute widow(er) beneﬁ  ts for new beneﬁ  ciaries aged a 
in period t,  βw,
a,  
N









a-1,t-1  (1–δa,t-1 )
Here,  δa,t refers to the mortality probability of those aged a in period t.  ASS includes information 
for calculating average (across beneﬁ  ciaries) of other [non-widow(er)] beneﬁ  ts, β0




t   / β0
a,t  = bw,
a 
N   ;  a = 60, 61. Using data on the population of beneﬁ  ciaries by beneﬁ  t–type, 
age, sex, and SSA-provided data on total population in t–1 and t,
Pa,t Pa,t
pw
a,t –  pw
a,t-1 (1 – δa,t-1 )
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   pw
a,t  /  Pa,t  =  πw
a and  p0
a,t /  Pa,t  =   π0
a for  a = 60, 61
Compute 
  ηw
a = Min{0, [pw
a,t – pw
a-1,t-1 (1 – δa,t-1)]/ pw
a,t  }—the fraction of widow(er) beneﬁ  ciaries that are 
new, for  a = 60, 61
 For  t > 2000 and a = 60, 61
1.  Obtain the proﬁ  le for other beneﬁ  ts in t = 2001 by growing the t = 2000 beneﬁ  ts:  The growth 
factor used equals SSA’s real-wage growth assumption:   β0
a,t = β0
a,t-1 (1 + γ).
2.  Use the ratio bw,
a,  
N
t   deﬁ  ned above to obtain βw,
a,  
N
t —average widow(er) beneﬁ  ts that would 
have resulted in the absence of the scheduled additional early widower reduction at age a for 
new widow(er)s at that age.
3.  The average (real) beneﬁ  ts of those who are already receiving widower beneﬁ  ts and those 
receiving other beneﬁ  ts are assumed to remain at the previous year’s level. 
4. Average  beneﬁ  ts per capita in t = 2001 are given by
  βa,t =   
βw
a-1,t-1   (1 – ηw
a )πw














 =    βw











Here, the ﬁ  rst term represents widower beneﬁ  ts at age a for those who received such beneﬁ  ts 
prior to year t. Of course, at a = 60 this term is zero because ηw
a =1. The second term imputes re-
duced widow(er) beneﬁ  ts for those who begin claiming such beneﬁ  ts in year t. In this term, the 
factor is θw
a  is the additional widow(er) reduction to be imposed on new beneﬁ  ciaries because 
of advancing FRA. This factor is computed as the ratio of a) the widow(er) reduction including ad-
ditional months of early beneﬁ  t receipts to b) the reduction excluding additional early months of 
beneﬁ  t receipt. For example, let U be the unreduced beneﬁ  t α and a the original reduction factor 





    in the second term above).  If δ (<α) represents the new reduction factor 
(including additional months of early beneﬁ  t receipt because of advancing FRA), the new reduced 
beneﬁ  t is Uδ.  To get the latter from the former we compute Uδ = Uα×(δ/α) = Uαθ. 
Widow(er) Beneﬁ  t  Reduction  at age a is computed as product of the monthly reduction 
amount times the number of months prior to FRA that widow(er) beneﬁ  t will be collected—age a 
through FRA. The monthly reduction amount equals 28.5 percent divided by the number of pos-
sible months of early retirement—from age sixty through FRA.  
Pa,t
Pa,t
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32Retirement Beneﬁ  t Reduction at age a equals 0.0056 percent times the number of months prior 
to FRA.
 Husband’s and Wife’s Beneﬁ  t Reduction at age a equals 0.0069 percent times the number of 
months prior to FRA.
Finally, retain the value βw
a,t  = πw
a [βw
a-1,t-1 (1 – ηw




   θw
a ηw
a ] for the next period’s cal-
culations.
Additional OASI Beneﬁ  t Reductions—Ages 62–66 to Adjust Proﬁ  les for Advancing FRA 
  βa,t  =   
βw
a,t  =  βr
a,t  pr
a,t  + βs
a,t  ps
a,t  + βw
a,t  pw
a,t  + β0
a,t p0
a,t
   βr
a,t =  average retirement beneﬁ  ts per capita for people aged a in period t
   βs
a,t =  average husbands/wives beneﬁ  ts per capita for people aged a in period t
   βw
a,t = average widow(er) beneﬁ  ts per capita for people aged a in period t
  β0
a,t  = average other [non-retirees, non-spouses, non-widow(er)s] beneﬁ  ts per capita for peo-
ple aged a in period t
  pr
a,t = population of those receiving retirement beneﬁ  t aged a in period t
  ps
a,t = population of those receiving husbands/wives beneﬁ  t recipients aged a in period t
  pw
a,t = population of those receiving widow(er) beneﬁ  ts aged a in period t
  p0
a,t= population of those receiving other [non-retirees, non-spousal, non-widow(er)] beneﬁ  ts 
aged a in period t
Set t = 2000
Use beneﬁ  ts by type, age, and sex to compute ratios br,
a
N
  , bs,
a
N
  , and bw,
a
N
   for ages a = 62, 100 in the 
manner described above. 
Again, using ASS beneﬁ  ciary data and SSA’s population projections compute
• ratios  πr
a , πs
a , and πw
a for a = 62, 100
•  ηr
a , ηs
a , and ηw
a —fractions of new beneﬁ  ciaries at a = 62, 100 (as deﬁ  ned earlier).
   For t > 2000 and a = 62...100
pa,t pa,t
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331.  Obtain the proﬁ  le for other beneﬁ  ts in t = 2001 by growing the t = 2000 beneﬁ  ts:  The growth 
factor used equals SSA’s real-wage growth assumption:   β0
a,t = β0
a,t-1 (1 – γ).
2.  Use the ratios br,
a
N
  , bs,
a
N
  , and bw,
a
N
   deﬁ  ned above to obtain βr,
a,  
N
t   , βs,
a,  
N
t   ,  and βw,
a,  
N
t  ,  respec-
tively—average beneﬁ  ts for new beneﬁ  ciaries that would have resulted in the absence of the 
scheduled additional early retiree, spousal, and widow(er) reductions at age sixty-two.
3. Average  beneﬁ  ts per capita in 2001 are given by












   +    βs
a-1,t-1(1 – ηs
a )πs








   +  βw
a-1,t-1(1 – ηw
a )πw



















   + βw
a-1,t-1(1 – ηw
a )πw
a  + β0























a,  and θw
a are additional retiree, spousal, and widow(er) reductions, respectively, im-
posed because of advancing FRA. See earlier discussion for details.
In each period and for each age, average beneﬁ  ts by type are calculated and stored for carrying 
forward into the next period’s calculations:
  βr
a,t  =  πr
a[βr
a-1,t-1(1 – ηr



















a,t  = πw
a [βw
a-1,t-1(1 – ηw











POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 5, DECEMBER 2003
34Appendix E: Calculating and Projecting Social Security Taxes and 
Beneﬁ  ts per Capita
Let ρx
b,t stand for the average amount of Social Security beneﬁ  ts received in period t by persons of 
sex x born in period b relative to the average beneﬁ  t received by forty-year-old males in period t (for 
whom b = −40). That is, ρx
b,t , b = −∆,…0;  x = (m,f), is the relative proﬁ  le of Social Security beneﬁ  ts 
for those alive in period t. Similarly, let  λx
b,t , b =  −∆,…0; x = (m,f), represent the relative proﬁ  le of 
payroll (OASDI) taxes. The values of ρx
b,t are calculated from data on average beneﬁ  ts and number 
of recipients for each type of OASDI beneﬁ  t by age and sex reported in the Annual Statistical Sup-
plement for year 2000 published by the Social Security Administration. Values of λx
b,t are obtained 
from the Current Population Survey for the latest available year 2001—containing data pertaining 
to the year 2000.
Let Bt represent the total amount of Social Security outlays in the base year (t = 2002).  The aver-
age beneﬁ  t paid to male forty-year-olds equals 
(E1)  βm
-40,t  =  
     Σ      Σ    ρx
b,t  px
b,t
Finally average Social Security beneﬁ  ts by age and sex in year t are calculated as
(E2)  Bx
b,t =   βm
-40,t  · ρx
b,t     b = −∆,…0, x = (m,f).  
An analogous procedure is used to calculate λx
b,t , b = −∆,…0,  x = (m,f).  
The relative proﬁ  les of Social Security beneﬁ  ts and payroll taxes are used to obtain per-capita 
beneﬁ  ts and taxes using this procedure for each year in Social Security’s projection horizon of 
seventy-ﬁ  ve years. The base-year relative proﬁ  le for payroll taxes is used for each year. The relative 
proﬁ  le of Social Security beneﬁ  ts is adjusted, however, to account for the scheduled increase in the 
full retirement age (FRA) over the next two decades. The method for adjusting each year’s relative 
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35 Appendix F: Derivation of Age-Sex Proﬁ  les for 
Medicare Revenues and Outlays
The relative age-sex proﬁ  le of Medicare Part A revenues is the same as that used for OASDI revenues 
in the base year—the taxable-ceiling-limited wage proﬁ  le by age and sex normalized to its value for 
forty-year-old males. This proﬁ  le was estimated from the Current Population Survey (March 2001) 
supplement containing data on wages and salaries for the year 2000.
The relative proﬁ  le of Medicare Part A outlays is constructed using SSA’s population projections 
and coefﬁ  cients of relative Medicare expenditures in Lee, Skinner, and McClellan (1999). Lee, Skin-
ner, and McClellan provide estimates by age and sex of Medicare outlays on those who survive for 
at least one year after the current year (“survivors”) and on those who die within the year (“dece-
dents”). The proﬁ  les of outlays by age and sex relative to outlays on a sixty-ﬁ  ve-year-old male survi-
vors constructed from these data is shown in table F1. In the following description, these relative 
values are denoted by εx
a, where a denotes age (a=65,…100) and x denotes sex (x = m, f).
For people aged a of sex x alive in year t, total Medicare Part A (HI) outlays are modeled as the 
sum of average outlays, mx
a,t,c, times the number of individuals,  px
a,t,c, in two survivorship categories, 
c:  Those who will survive for at least one more year and those who will not.  
Let the year-t populations of those aged a and of sex x belonging to the two survivorship catego-
ries be denoted by  px
a,t,1+  and  px
a,t,0, respectively. Using SSA’s population projections (and abstract-
ing from complications introduced by immigration) one can determine the number of individuals 
in the two categories at all ages for both sexes in future years t:
 (F1)  px
a,t,1+ =   px
a,t+1          }
     
for a = 65,…98; x = m, f
 p x
a,t,0  =   px
a,t – px
a,t,1+
For the populations aged ninety-nine and one hundred in all future years, it is assumed that the ra-
tio of survivors to decedents equals that calculated for age ninety-eight. As mentioned earlier, total 
Medicare Part A expenditures on people aged a and of sex x in year t, Mx
a,t , can be expressed as:
(F2)  Mx
a,t  =   mx
a,t,1+ px
a,t,1+ +  mx
a,t,0 px
a,t,0.
TABLE F1 RELATIVE PROFILES OF ANNUAL MEDICARE OUTLAYS FOR SURVIVORS BEYOND 










65–69 1.0000 0.9092 6.2971 7.4775
70–74 1.2902 1.1761 6.3186 7.3520
75–79 1.5740 1.4552 6.3009 6.5755
80–84 1.8552 1.7495 5.6441 5.3562
85–89 2.0228 1.9616 5.1568 4.6760
90–94 1.8701 1.9345 4.1032 3.4136
95–100 1.8701 1.9345 4.1032 3.4136
SOURCE: Lee, McClellan, and Skinner, “Distributional Effects of Medicare,” Tax Policy and the 
Economy, August 1999.
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36Noting that mx
a,t,c /mm
65,t,1+ =  εx
a,t,c represents the relative outlay for people in year t aged a of sex 
x and belonging to survivorship category c, we can rewrite equation (F2) as
 (F3)  Mx






Summing over all ages and both sexes in year t, we obtain total Medicare Part A outlays for people 
sixty-ﬁ  ve and older in year t as
(F4)  M65+,t =   mm





Equation (F4) can be solved to obtain the average expenditure on sixty-ﬁ  ve-year-old male-survi-
vors in year t as
(F5)  mm
65,t,1+    =    




a,t,0]    
.
Finally, expenditures per capita on individuals aged a and of sex x in year t are calculated from 
equation (F3)—
(F6)     mx






a,t,0]   
. 
Medicare Part A expenditures on the elderly in future years t are obtained by applying to pro-
jected total Medicare Part A outlays the projected share of expenditures on those aged sixty-four 
and younger. The projected share of outlays on young individuals through 2070 was obtained from 
the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce. These projections were extended through 2080 using the trend in 
the share between 2061 and 2070 (see ﬁ  gure F1). 
For those aged sixty-four and younger (young spouses and survivors eligible for Medicare ben-
eﬁ  ts), beneﬁ  ts per capita are calculated by distributing their share of Medicare outlays according 
to their relative beneﬁ  t proﬁ  les by age and sex. Table F2 shows the relative beneﬁ  t proﬁ  le values 
obtained from by Lee, McClellan, and Skinner (1999).
For years beyond 2080, year-2080’s per capita beneﬁ  ts are extrapolated by applying two growth 
factors. The ﬁ  rst factor equals an assumed growth rate of per-capita Medicare beneﬁ  ts, gh, due to 
non-demographic factors such as larger demand and greater intensity of use of medical services 
due to economic growth. The second factor is designed to capture the impact of projected mortal-
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37to die within one year relative to those projected to survive for more than a year. This factor,  gx
d ,  is 
calculated separately for both sexes as
(F7)   gx
d =






a,t+1,0]   
.
Given year t’s beneﬁ  ts per capita by age and sex, year t+1’s beneﬁ  ts per capita are calculated as
(F8)  mx
a,t+1       =  mx
a,t+1 (1 + gx
d )(1 + gh ).
FIGURE F1 PROJECTED SHARE OF MEDICARE (PART A) OUTLAYS ON THOSE AGED 0–64
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